In the first section, the Soviet Union and Germany competed for the strategic initiative.
After the Moscow battle and the Soviet army launched the winter general attack, the strength of the German army was greatly weakened.
At the end of the winter operation, the total number of German casualties reached more than 1.
Nevertheless, in the spring of 1942, they still had a huge force of 8.
6 million people.
In the Soviet German battlefield, nearly 6.
2 million German troops and their servants, 3229 tanks, about 57000 guns and 3395 combat aircraft were deployed.
After the Soviet army won the two major battles, its strength was greatly enhanced.
By May 1942, the Soviet army had 5.
1 million combat troops, about 3900 tanks, 44900 artillery and mortars and more than 2200 combat aircraft.
At the same time, the Allies provided more and more assistance to the Soviet army, and took more and more positive actions against the German army.
Japan’s northward advance was less and less likely to threaten the Soviet Union.
From the overall situation, the situation in the Soviet German battlefield has developed in a direction favorable to the Soviet army.
On April 5, 1942, the German general command issued the No.
41 instruction for the operation on the eastern front.
It was forced to give up the offensive strategy of the whole line that it had always pursued and adopt the successive offensive strategy, requiring “annihilate the remaining living forces of the Soviet army, seize its most important war economic resources as much as possible” and regain the strategic initiative.
The basic principles of operations are: the Middle Route Army slows down its offensive speed.
In the north, we should capture grad and establish land contact with the Finnish army.
On the south wing of the Army front, it should be wedged into the Caucasus.
Taking into account the results of the winter battle, available forces, weapons and transportation conditions, the above objectives can only be achieved step by step.
Hitler’s order of priority was: at present, all available forces should be concentrated in the main battle direction in the southern section, so as to annihilate the enemy in front of the Don river, and then occupy the oil fields in the Caucasus and the passage to the Caucasus mountains.
Once the situation in the besieged area permits, or sufficient troops are drawn from other places, Leningrad and ingermanland should be captured at last.
In order to achieve the above objectives and prepare for the summer war, Hitler decided to first eliminate the Soviet Army on the Kerch Peninsula in Crimea, occupy Sevastopol and eradicate the Soviet Army’s prominent part in balvenkovo in Kharkov region.
While Hitler was preparing to defeat the Soviet Union, the Soviet supreme command was also brewing a plan to completely crush Hitler’s army in 1942.
The Soviet supreme command believes that in the summer of 1942, the German army may launch a large-scale attack in Moscow and the southern line, in which the Moscow direction will be the main attack direction of the German army, which will determine the success or failure of the war in the summer of 1942.
To this end, the Soviet Army concentrated most of the troops of the strategic reserve in the Bryansk region.
The 5th tank group army also launched behind the Bryansk front army.
There are only a few reserves in the southwest, and there is no emergency action plan.
After the Soviet offensive in winter, the necessary reserves are still in training, and the strength and weapons are not enough to carry out large-scale offensive campaigns.
Therefore, as for the action plan for the latter period, the Soviet supreme command decided to take active strategic defense, but at the same time, it should be in the direction of Crimea, Leningrad and jamiyansk, Kharkov region, Smolensk A local offensive campaign will be carried out in the direction of Lvov Kursk.
The enemy will be exhausted and exhausted in the early summer.
After accumulating enough reserves, a large-scale attack will be launched.
In late April 1942, the Soviet supreme command approved the southwest front army to carry out the Kharkov offensive campaign with the cooperation of some forces of the southern front army.
The plan is determined: from voltchangk and balvin to Kharkov to launch a center attack, smashing the German Kharkov group, capturing Kharkov, and then adjusting the deployment.
Raids were carried out from the northeast to capture Dnepropetrovsk and sinelinikovo, so that the German army lost the important ferry on the dnepro River and the railway hub of sinelinikovo, creating conditions for the liberation of Donbas.
In order to facilitate the command of the army on the south wing in the upcoming summer attack, the Soviet supreme command appointed bujoni as the commander-in-chief of the north Caucasus on April 21, 1942 to uniformly command the fleet of the Crimean front army, the Sevastopol defense area, the north Caucasus military area, the Caspian Sea and the Azov Sea area.
The battle between the Soviet Union and Germany for strategic initiative began when the German army attacked the Kerch Peninsula in the spring of 1942.
Before the German army attacked the Kerch Peninsula, the situation here was very complicated.
Facing the German army in this area is the Crimean front army of the Soviet army, which has a group army with reinforced weapons in the 47th, 51st and 44th divisions, with a total of 21 infantry divisions, 3577 artillery and mortars, 347 tanks and 400 aircraft.
Compared with the 10 and a half infantry divisions, 2472 artillery and mortars, 180 tanks and less than 400 aircraft owned by the 11th group army of the German army, the Soviet army has a clear advantage.
From February to April, the Crimean front army tried to break through the German defense line three times, but failed and was forced to turn to defense.
However, the battle situation of the front army is still deployed according to the offensive situation, which is not suitable for defense.
23’s troops are concentrated on the prominent arc position from the north to KITT.
There are only three divisions in the first line in the south, plus two or three divisions of the reserve team.
There are less than six divisions, so the troops are weak.
According to the layout of the Soviet army, Manstein of the German army formulated a battle plan code named “bustard”.
The basic attempt of the “bustard” plan is: the 30th army launched an unexpected attack on the weak Southern defense line of the Soviet Army along the Black Sea coast with the strength of three divisions, quickly detoured to the rear and flank of the northern Soviet army after breaking through the defense line, and encircled and annihilated the Northern Soviet army group together with the 40th second army of the German army and the 7th army of Romania, who were engaged in a feint mission in the north.
At the same time, the German army planned to send a battalion of troops from feodocia to land behind the Soviet Army by assault boats.
On May 8, 1942, the 11th group army of the German army launched the “bustard” operation, and the aviation troops carried out intensive raids on the Crimean front army.
The German 30th army, which was in charge of the main attack task, first launched an attack on the Soviet 44th army, which was weak.
The German army, which was in charge of the sneak attack task, also landed successfully behind the Soviet army.
Due to the lack of adequate preparation, the 44th group army did not establish in-depth echelon defense, and the defense line was quickly broken through.
The German army then quickly made a detour to the 47th and 51st group armies of the Soviet army in the north in an attempt to encircle the Soviet army in the north.
Given the situationSeriously, the Soviet supreme command ordered the Crimean front army to withdraw to the Turkish barrier in the early morning of May 10 to organize tenacious defense.
However, the leaders of the front army did not carry out the orders of the supreme command.
On May 11, the Supreme Command instructed bujoni, the commander-in-chief of the north Caucasus, to rush to Kerch City, where the headquarters of the Crimean front army is located, to rectify the military committee of the front army, “use all defensive means, all troops, air force and Naval Weapons to prevent the enemy from advancing to the east of the Turkish barrier”.
Because the Crimean front army missed the opportunity and delayed its withdrawal for two days and nights, it failed to organize a strong defense in the Turkish barrier.
On May 13, the Turkish barrier was broken through.
On May 14, the German army rushed to the West and south of Kechi city.
After obtaining the approval of the supreme command, bujoni was forced to order the Crimean front army to withdraw from the Kerch peninsula.
On the 15th, the German army occupied the Kerch peninsula.
From May 15 to 19, the Soviet army fought back against the German attack and withdrew across the Kerch Strait to the Taman peninsula.
Nearly 120000 people were evacuated in a few days.
Those who failed to withdraw remained in many quarries on the Kerch Peninsula to fight, and most of them died heroically in the end.
In the first World War on Kerch Peninsula, the Crimean front army of the Soviet army, which had a great advantage in military strength and weapons, lost about 176500 people, more than 300 tanks, nearly 3500 guns and 400 aircraft.
This was the first serious defeat of the Soviet army since the victory of the Moscow defense war.
The Soviet supreme command attached great importance to this and issued a special instruction on June 4, 1942, summarizing the reasons for the Soviet Army’s defeat.
The instruction pointed out that the basic reason for the defeat of the Soviet army was that the leaders of the Crimean front army “did not understand the nature of modern war”.
This is prominently reflected in the fact that they spread out all divisions into a front line, failed to establish the second and third echelons, and failed to send enough troops to resist the enemy and close the breakthrough after the enemy broke through the defense line.
Moreover, regardless of the terrain characteristics of the open plains, all infantry and artillery are too close to the enemy.
It is unable to effectively organize the coordination between various group armies and between ground forces and aviation forces.
Lack of organization during withdrawal.
Tactically, when the German army carried out the main assault on the left wing, the Soviet army did not take effective measures to strengthen the right wing in time, but passively and lazily fought.
As a result, the German army easily broke through the defense line and reached encirclement.
After seizing the Kerch Peninsula, the 11th German army turned all its forces to attack Sevastopol, gathering a strong force of about 204000 people, 450 tanks, more than 2000 artillery and 600 aircraft.
Compared with 106000 Soviet troops stationed in Sevastopol, 600 guns, 38 tanks and 53 aircraft, the German army has a clear advantage.
From June 2 to 7, Sevastopol was heavily attacked by German ground and aviation artillery.
At dawn on June 7, the German army turned to attack.
The 54th army of the German army carried out the main assault from the north and northeast to the eastern end of the Beiwan Bay, the 30th army carried out the auxiliary assault from the camare area across the Sarian mountains to the eastern and southern suburbs of Sevastopol, and the Romanian mountain army restrained it in the middle section.
Five days ago, the Soviet Army resisted the crazy attack of the German army.
As the German army successfully blocked the Soviet Army’s transportation supply line from the sea, the supply of Sevastopol’s defenders became increasingly difficult, ammunition was in short supply, and the consumption of troops was also great.
On the contrary, after being strengthened by the 17th army, the German assault force was greatly enhanced.
On June 18, after paying a huge price, the German army advanced to Beiwan, Inkerman and sapon mountain.
On June 29, the German army wedged into the urban area of Sevastopol.
The suvasto army was forced to retreat for 6 months.
The Soviet army lost the main base of the Crimean sea, and the whole Soviet fleet fell into the hands of the Crimean sea.
For the Soviet army, this further worsened the overall situation to a considerable extent.
For Germany, it is naturally advantageous, because this will enable the German army to free up a group army with combat capability and a considerable number of reinforced weapons.
On May 12, 1942, the fifth day after the German attack in Kerch, the Soviet southwest front army turned to attack in the direction of Kharkov.
The German army was also preparing to attack at that time.
The purpose was to hold Kharkov, eliminate the danger of the German army’s traffic line in the south wing of Dnepropetrovsk area, and occupy the west of the North Donets River and the southeast of Kharkov, so as to create conditions for crossing the river eastward.
To this end, the German army assembled a large number of troops in Kharkov area.
The attack of the Soviet southwest front army started smoothly, and each assault group broke through the defense of the German Sixth Army within three days.
Pushing 18 to 25 kilometers north of Kharkov and 25 to 50 kilometers south, the German Sixth Army is in a critical situation.
If the Soviet army put the rapid corps into a breakthrough in time, it could quickly expand the war results.
However, the leaders of the southwest front army were confused by the intelligence of the German tank heavy Corps in the so-called zmiyov area.
They did not put the tank troops into battle until the 17th, delaying the fighters.
The German army was able to calmly mobilize reinforcements, close the breakthrough, and organize tenacious defense in the rear.
The Soviet Army’s attack speed decreased sharply.
On the morning of May 17, the German “kleister” group turned into a counter offensive with 15 divisions in slavyansk and kramatolsk.
This situation completely exceeded the expectations of the Soviet ninth group army and the entire southern front army.
After a day and night of fierce fighting, the German army broke through the defense line of the ninth group army and pushed forward for 20 kilometers, which soon posed a threat to the rear of the assault cluster of the 57th group army and the southwest front army attacking Kharkov from the south.
The Military Commission of the southwest front army did not pay due attention to this serious threat, and the Soviet supreme command failed to recognize the situation and did not accept the proposal put forward by the Soviet chief of general staff huasilevski to immediately stop the attack on Kharkov in order to eliminate the threat from the south.
On May 18, the situation of the southwest front army deteriorated sharply.
Huasilevski once again proposed to stop the attack, transfer the main troops of the balvenkovo assault group, eliminate the wedging enemy and restore the situation of the ninth group army, but it was again rejected by the supreme command.
On May 19, the situation worsened.
It was not until the German army wedged into the Soviet rear in the afternoon and tried to encircle the Soviet army in the protruding part of balvenkovo that the Soviet Army ordered to stop the attack on Kharkov and turn the southern group to deal with the wedged enemy, but it was too late.
By this time, the German army had hit the ninth group army hard and drove it past Dayton.