Lecture 16 social changes of oil producing countries in the Middle East after the Second World War after the Second World War, with the development of oil, oil producing countries in the Middle East entered a period of rapid economic development.

At the same time, the development of oil economy has also had a far-reaching impact on the social structure of relevant countries.

The traditional political basis of the oil producing country with monarchy as the main body is family politics, and the main social basis is religious nobility, farmers and herdsmen (especially tribes closely related to the royal family), believers and businessmen belonging to the same sect as the ruling group.

With the development of the country after the Second World War, the ruling group gradually adjusted its policies towards some former main supporters and expanded its fight for the general public.

Therefore, while promoting economic development, most conservative oil producing countries have also made great efforts to promote social development and adopted a series of policies.

One of these policies is to develop education and health care. I. decline and change of the number of nomads in pastoral areas, the main changes are the rapid decline of the number of nomads and the gradual disintegration of tribes.

In the peninsula region, nomads have always accounted for a large proportion of the population.

Saudi Arabia has the largest proportion of nomads in its population.

According to the book “in the hinterland of the Arabian Peninsula” published by Fouad Hamza in 1933, 58% of the Saudi population is nomadic and the rest is settled.

After the war, the nomadic system, which lasted for thousands of years, began to face a serious crisis.

First, the environment of nomadism has deteriorated.

The demand of herdsmen for traditional animal husbandry products is reduced.

Some oil producing countries import a large number of live livestock, meat and dairy products from abroad and provide them with considerable subsidies, which has an impact on the cattle and sheep raised by herdsmen.

The promotion of modern means of transportation such as cars and aircraft has reduced the demand for camels.

In Saudi Arabia, it has also dealt a heavy blow to the pilgrim transportation industry engaged by nomads.

In some areas, overgrazing has led to pasture degradation, drought and desertification have also affected the viability of nomads, and the determination of national boundaries, which began before the war, has limited the migration of nomads.

Secondly, the development of cities, oil fields and government paramilitary forces (such as Saudi National Guard) has provided new employment opportunities and good school and medical conditions for nomads.

At the same time, the fixed water sources in some places, such as oil fields, also encourage herdsmen to settle around to facilitate the drinking of livestock, especially in summer.

In the mid-1990s, the Saudi National Guard had 77000 active personnel and well-equipped.

According to the general law, nomads settled first for farming, but in the Gulf countries, many of them went directly to the city and skipped the farming stage.

However, due to their low educational level, many of them have become taxi drivers, gardeners, doormen, guides, National Guard soldiers, construction workers and so on.

A large number of immigrants caused a shortage of labor in pastoral areas.

Saudi Arabia even had to import herdsmen from backward neighboring countries such as Jordan and Iraq.

At the same time, large-scale emigration weakened tribal and family relations, although chiefs living in cities often maintained frequent contacts with the original tribes.

On the other hand, tribes still maintain a strong influence.

People from the same tribe often live together in cities.

Tribal family ties help new immigrants to adapt to the environment.

At the same time, new tribes continue to form.

The lifestyle of nomads and semi nomads who remain in agricultural and pastoral areas has also changed.

They received subsidies from the government for livestock, improved seeds, feed and the purchase of cars.

They bought water pumps, tractors and cars.

Cars became indispensable to nomads, helping them transport water and livestock and take care of camels.

Some big herdsmen also bought water trucks for long-distance grazing.

Therefore, herdsmen stay in one place longer and move faster.

Of course, the main beneficiaries of government policies are big herdsmen and chiefs.

In addition, a number of modern farms using foreign labor force have emerged in various countries. II. Social changes in settled rural areas in settled rural areas, there have been more significant changes in class relations after the war.

The big landlords have always been the dominant force of politics and economy between the two world wars.

Their characteristics are that they are basically external landlords living in cities.

Their sources include businessmen, officials, chiefs, religious elites, etc.

but they were devastated in the land reform of Iran and Iran, and a large number of land was purchased by the government (the Iranian royal family took the initiative to sell land before the “white revolution”).

Many big landlords took advantage of the government’s compensation to invest heavily in industry and Commerce and became capitalists.

Others tend to use mechanized farming and hire workers on the reserved land to become farmers.

The purpose of Iran’s land reform is to transfer the land of large landlords to the hands of rich farmers and small landlords, so as to bring the upper class farmers into the social foundation of the government and promote the development of commercial production.

Supporting measures for land reform include nationalization of forests, pastures and water sources.

In the land reform, the small landlords were less affected, the farm workers did not get any land, and the original uneven possession of the leased land by the tenants was retained intact.

According to a survey at the end of the land reform in 1974.

33% of the rural population has no land, 39% have an average land area of 2 hectares, 12% have an average land area of 7 hectares, 14% have an average land area of 18 hectares and 0.

5% have an average land area of 190 hectares.

The cooperatives established after the land reform are also mainly controlled by rich farmers.

The proportion of self-employed farmers in Iraq is larger.

In the mid-1970s, agricultural workers accounted for 3.

9% of Iraq’s rural population, basically landless employees accounted for 10.

3%, poor small farmers 15.

6%, middle farmers 41.

5%, rich farmers 20.

7%, and agricultural capitalists and landlords 8.0%. For farmers whose land scale is insufficient to make a living, they must subsidize their families by renting land, going out to work, working in cities and engaging in handicraft activities.

Coupled with the government’s neglect of agriculture, the overall effect of the land reform between Iran and Iran is not good.

After the late 1970s, Iraq gradually changed its policy.

After the adoption of Law No.

35 in 1983, collective farms decreased, cooperatives disappeared, the upper limit of land ownership was relaxed, and the control of farmers who accepted land in the land reform was relaxed.

Therefore, farmers can more easily obtain credit, close to the country’s wholesale market, and its development has accelerated.

In Iran, after the Islamic revolution, the land distribution act was passed in 1980, confiscating 50000 hectares of landlord land and renting it to farmers, while 750000 hectares of barren and wasteland were distributed to farmers.

In Saudi Arabia, small farmers began to use agricultural machinery with government fundingChemical fertilizer, improved seeds and more irrigation water have been obtained, and the commercialization of production has also been developed.

At the same time, there are also farms with modern farming methods.

After the mid-1970s, large farms obtained most of the state-owned land allocated by the government, developed rapidly, and became the main beneficiaries of national credit, means of production and agricultural subsidies.

The farm mainly uses foreign technicians and foreign workers to produce wheat and eggs.

In the mid-1980s, six large companies controlled 30% of the wheat market in Saudi Arabia.

On the other hand, small-scale farmers are facing business difficulties due to difficulties in obtaining state credit, the decline of groundwater level and population growth.

Many people lose their land and flow into cities, and even the whole village is abandoned.

After 1975, the government strengthened investment in backward areas, and the situation of a large number of immigrants to cities was alleviated.

In 1990, the total number of farmers and herdsmen in Saudi Arabia decreased to 569000, accounting for only 9.

9% of the total labor force. III. The social structure of cities and the social structure of big bourgeois cities have changed greatly.

The situation of urban social structure in Iraq in 1977.

In Peninsula countries, the lack of land resources and the long-term existence of tribal land system make the landlord class less powerful (as mentioned above, an important source of landlords is actually businessmen), and businessmen have always had a significant influence.

They are the providers of funds to the royal family and Emir, so they enjoy various benefits and become political advisers to the royal family.

The growth of oil revenue before World War II enabled the royal family to gradually get rid of its dependence on businessmen.

The former continued to give economic benefits to businessmen and prevented them from playing a role in politics.

Iranian businessmen also experienced the same process during the period of Reza Khan.

In Iraq, the post-war big bourgeoisie suffered a heavy blow from nationalization, while in other countries it experienced rapid development.

In the early post-war Peninsula countries, providing materials and contracting projects for Western oil companies and the royal family has become an important way for the rise of private capital, such as the Manny family and davish family in Qatar.

Since then, private capital has benefited from a series of measures such as the state’s protectionist measures, development plan appropriations, government procurement, tax exemption policies (the company is exempt from income tax and only receives day classes), low interest loans, hydropower subsidies, land subsidies, imported semi-finished products, equipment subsidies, foreign investment access restrictions and so on.

For example, the government often transfers the land in the city to the private at a low price, and then buys it back at a high price for development, from which the real estate developers make countless profits.

In Kuwait, the purchase of land accounted for 24 per cent of total government expenditure in 1960-1965.

Moreover, since the government stipulates that foreign investors must have local partners to start companies, locals can easily take shares or act as agents for foreign companies and receive large dividends.

For example, the davish family in Qatar served as agents of famous Western companies such as Austin, Philip, dunlup, general electric, Volkswagen, Audi and Fiat in the 1950s.

In Saudi Arabia, Han Zhi businessmen with certain independence before the war were ignored, while Neizhi businessmen with close interpersonal and geographical relations with the royal family and bureaucrats rose rapidly and became the most important industrialist group and the political pillar of the government in China.

In addition, the opening up in the 1970s led to the further development of private capital.

In Iraq, 2788 contractors were registered with the government in 1973.

In 1980, the number of millionaires exceeded 700.

The big bourgeoisie in oil producing countries has the following characteristics: first, strong dependence.

It is manifested in the heavy dependence on government development plans, nepotism and foreign capital, and most of them have poor operating efficiency.

Second, the rapidity of the rise.

Third, the unity of composition.

As most oil producing countries have a poor foundation, the state monopolizes basic industries, and Iraq is nationalized, the private capital of other countries except Iran is mainly limited to commerce, import and export, construction, finance and services, and lags behind in manufacturing.

Fourth, transnational development is earlier.

A large amount of petrodollars quickly transferred private capital into the financial industry, and the limited domestic market prompted it to expand overseas, especially in the Gulf region.

For example, Kuwait’s large private companies that actively engaged in foreign investment in the 1980s include Kuwait National Investment Company, “international oil consortium” and futuhe investment company. IV. major changes have also taken place in the situation of the urban petty bourgeoisie.

The composition of this class is complex, including traditional small traders, small business owners, handicraftsmen, as well as emerging civil servants, professionals and military officers.

The latter is often called “new middle class” by western scholars.

In oil producing countries, traditional small-scale industrialists and businessmen still occupy an important position, despite the rapid development of the big bourgeoisie and state-owned enterprises and the fierce impact of imported goods.

This is due to the traditional family factors in the Middle East and the duality of economic development.

In Iraq, in 1962, the employees of large industrial enterprises (with 10 or more employees) accounted for 64.

3% of the total employment, while those of small enterprises (with less than 10 employees) accounted for 35.7%. In 1981, the above proportions were 73.

3% and 26.

7% respectively.

It can be seen that small enterprises still account for a considerable proportion.

In Iran, due to the development of the big bourgeoisie, the traditional bazaar (market) businessmen were ignored, and they became an important supporting force for the Islamic revolution.

The establishment of the nation-state and the expansion of state functions have led to the rapid expansion of administrative institutions, the increase of state-owned enterprises, the development of education and urbanization and other reasons, resulting in the continuous growth of the “new middle class”.

In addition, a large number of students in various countries have developed rapidly after the war.

In Saudi Arabia, the government stipulates that all educated and trained citizens must work for the government for at least five years, otherwise it is illegal.

In the mid-1980s, 87% of the citizens in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia, served in government departments.

The development of education has created conditions for the residents of small and medium-sized cities and towns to enter the upper class of society.

In Iraq, from 1958 to 1963, 36% of cabinet ministers came from small and medium-sized cities with less than 200000 people, 63% from 1963 to 1968 and 75% in the 1970s. 5. Slaves, industrial workers and the urban poor.

Among the middle and lower classes in the city, slaves are the only class that has completely disappeared.

In 1952, the Emir of Qatar issued an order to liberate slaves.

In 1962, the Saudi government officially announced the abolition of slavery.

Oman also announced the abolition of slavery after kabs succeeded to the throne.

Industrial workers are another rapidly rising class.

However, due to the lack of manufacturing in oil producing countriesAfter the conflict ended in 1975, the government increased investment and provided a total of US $1.

1 billion in loans to the Kurdish region by 1976 for the construction of industry, water conservancy, education, medical treatment, roads and communication facilities.

In Saudi Arabia, in the late 1970s, Shia anti-government riots broke out in oil-rich Dongfang province.

One of the reasons was the backward social and economic development of Shia.

After the riots, the government accelerated the economic development of Dongfang province. IX. polarization in rich oil producing countries, the polarization of wealth has become an inevitable phenomenon.

In Iraq, the average income of urban residents was 25% higher than that of rural residents in 1971.

In the same year, the income of the top 10% of urban households was 26 times that of the bottom 10%.

In 1977, the number of poor people in Iraq and Iran was 1.

5 million and 8.

7 million respectively, accounting for 13% and 25% of the population of the two countries.

Royal family members, entrepreneurs, contractors, brokers and senior government officials have become the new wealth of oil producing cities.

At the same time, governments have also taken measures to vigorously develop social welfare, exempt citizens from the tax burden, provide large subsidies for food, housing, water and electricity (foreigners can also enjoy benefits such as food subsidies), and implement free education and medical treatment, but the social gap still exists.

Generally speaking, the contemporary oil producing countries in the Middle East have experienced rapid and significant social changes, from traditional society to modern society.

In the meantime, social contradictions of different degrees have emerged in various countries.

In Iran and Iraq, this contradiction mainly exists within the people and is relatively sharp, which eventually led to the Islamic revolution in Iran and the serious ethnic and sectarian disputes in Iraq after the Iraq war.

In the six Gulf countries, the contradiction is relatively eased, which is mainly reflected between their nationals and foreign immigrants.

On the whole, compared with the economy, the social structure of oil producing countries shows obvious lag.