Polish officers and policemen were not destroyed psychologically and spiritually. They have not abandoned their motherland, religion, political views and moral values. The hope of Soviet leaders to transform even a part of the workers, peasants and intellectuals in military uniforms was dashed.

author unit: Russian Institute of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

the original text is contained in the original chapter title of the rise and collapse of a great power: how was the tragedy born – “Katyn incident” and pre War Soviet Polish relations

September 17, 1939, The Soviet Union invaded Poland after Germany. The superiority of the Soviet army in terms of military strength and the enemy situation of Poland made the Soviet military action in Poland go smoothly. In only ten days, the set goal of eliminating the Polish state and occupying western Ukraine and Western Belarus was achieved. The Soviet military action in Poland inevitably brought two urgent problems: one is to deal with a large number of Polish prisoners of war, and the other is how to completely turn the occupied territory into a “legitimate” part of the Soviet Union. These two problems not only influence each other, but also have some connections. In the past, due to the limitation of Soviet archival materials, people did not know how to deal with these two problems. After studying the files declassified in recent years, the author feels that their solution is not entirely the result of someone’s will, but mainly the result of the role of the Soviet political concept and political system.

in mid May, according to the statistics of the prisoner of war administration, 14587 people were sent from three special prisoner of war camps for execution, and 15131 people were shot together with prisoners of war sent from other places. Another 7305 prisoners held in prisons in western Ukraine and Western Belarus were also executed. Some of the dead Polish officers were buried in Katyn, near Smolensk, and became the first silent revelers of the tragedy three years later.

and the reason for the execution of these Polish elites, Russian scholars pointed out: “The Bolshevik leaders, with the help of their staff and spies, found that although most Polish officers and police lived under very difficult conditions of capture for more than half a year, they were not destroyed psychologically and spiritually. They did not abandon their motherland, their religion, their political views and moral values. Soviet leaders The hope of “transforming” even some workers, peasants and intellectuals who have put on military uniforms has failed. ”

the initial measures taken by the Soviet Union to deal with Polish prisoners of war

it should be said that the Soviet Union considered the issue of prisoners of war from the beginning. On the day of dispatch, belia sent a letter to Molotov, conveying the request of the general staff of the Red Army to open eight prisoner receiving stations and two distribution stations. At the same time, it was suggested that the escort troops of the people’s Committee of the interior should be responsible for the guarding and reconciliation of the prisoner receiving stations and distribution stations. To this end, he requested the National Defense Committee under the people’s Committee of the Soviet Union to adopt a resolution on transferring the escorted troops of the Ministry of internal affairs to a wartime state and mobilizing them. The eight POW receiving stations are located in zhtkovic, stolbuzi, dimkovic, radoshkovic, yarmolinqi, kamenez podoliski, shepetovka, volochsk and other places. The two distribution stations are kozelisk and putivli. The next day, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Bolshevik) approved the resolution adopted by the National Defense Commission on the proposal of belia. From September 20, the escorted troops of the special military region of Belarus, Ukraine and the grad military region were transferred to a wartime state.

on September 19, the Ministry of the people’s Committee of the interior issued another major measure to deal with the issue of prisoners of war. Under the Ministry of the people’s Committee of the interior, a special organization responsible for prisoners of war affairs, the prisoners of war administration, was established. Major Pi Ka soplunenko was appointed as the director of the pow administration, Xie wa nekhoroshev as the political commissar of the Bureau, and Yi khohlov and yo mi polushin as the deputy directors. According to the regulations of the pow Administration Bureau formulated subsequently, it “directly leads the establishment of the POW camp and the allocation, reception, registration, detention and use of pow labor, formulates the regulations of the pow reception station and the POW camp, and promulgates the detailed rules and instructions of the detention and internal rules and regulations of the POW camp.” The

prisoner of war administration has set up eight detention camps in ostashkov, kozelisk, yukhnov, putivli, olan and Yuza of the Russian Federation, kozelyssk and old bersk of Ukraine. The internal structure, staffing and functions of various departments of each prison camp are stipulated in the regulations on prison camps promulgated on September 23.

in the institutions of the POW camp, the special section deserves special attention. Its function is to eliminate counter revolutionaries against prisoners of war. In the order approving the establishment of the pow Administration Bureau, belia particularly stressed the need to carry out counter insurgency work in various POW camps. On September 19, the Ministry of the people’s Committee of the interior issued instructions to the special sections of the prisoner of war camps, requiring them to establish special prisoner of war espionage files and reconnaissance files when registering prisoners of war, “For prisoners of war who carry out anti Soviet activities, are suspected of espionage, and have ties with the Polish socialist party, bisusky elements, national Democrats, Social Democrats, anarchists and other counter revolutionary political parties and organizations, as well as all military officers, resume files shall be established, and these files shall be registered in a special book.” The special section shall also submit a monthly operational report to the special office and the first special office of the Ministry of the people’s Committee of the interior, indicating the number of prisoners of war held in the prison camp, including the number of officers, gendarmerie and staff of national security institutions, as well as the number of resume files established, the number of espionage obtained, the number of secret agents and intelligence agents recruited and the number of arrested.

it can be seen that from the beginning, this institution in the prison camp was given a special mission.

according to the size of the above battalions, up to 68000 prisoners of war can be held in the eight prisoner of war camps by late October, which is different from the actual number of prisoners of war captured by the front-line forcesVery big. This situation is bound to put great pressure on the reception and management of prisoner camps. In addition, according to belia’s order on September 19, it will take about 10 days to launch each prisoner of war camp. If combined with various practical problems encountered in the process of establishing the prisoner of war camp and the delay caused by bureaucratic style, it is still a problem whether each prisoner of war camp can be ready within the specified time, which is in strong contrast to the rapid progress of the Soviet army in Poland. It will have a lot of influence on the reception and management of prisoners of war in the early stage of the prison camp.

front-line troops soon found that they were facing various problems caused by the huge number of prisoners of war. On September 21, deputy national defense people’s Committee Kulik, Molotov, Voroshilov and others reported that because they were not prepared to accept such a large number of prisoners of war, the troops were unable to provide them with food; In addition, escorting and guarding prisoners of war also involved a lot of manpower. “Some prisoners of war were sent by railway from stanislavov to ancient Xiajing, but most of them have scattered home.”. In this regard, he suggested that “the government should issue instructions to demobilize the captured Ukrainian and Belarusian prisoners after registration…”

Belarusian interior people’s Committee La Fu tsanava also reported to Moscow: “Thousands of soldiers fled the front line and crowded the streets in the western regions. It was impossible to isolate them by the strength of the action team. The Red Army troops did not catch them as prisoners of war. As a result, no one vetted them, and the Polish soldiers walked around freely.”

Kulik’s suggestions reflect that the front-line forces lack the necessary ideological preparation for capturing so many prisoners of war in a short time. Under such circumstances, the local release of some prisoners of war is also a helpless way. Because if there is a balance between fighting and guarding prisoners of war, there is no doubt that the former should be given priority. On September 23, Voroshilov and Shaposhnikov replied to Kulik and basically agreed with his proposal: “if the captured farmers in western Ukraine and Western Belarus can produce documents to prove that they were indeed recruited by poles, they can be released.”

but this move was immediately questioned by Le wa Mehlis, director of the General Political Department of the Red Army. In his letter to Stalin on September 24, he described that a large number of demobilized prisoners blocked almost all roads, and said that many of them tried to go to the areas occupied by the Germans, mixed with many officers and police. It seemed that Mehlis’s letter had an effect on Stalin, because the next day Voroshilov issued another order to revoke the order to release the peasant prisoners of war two days ago. In this way, the diversion of prisoners of war was blocked, and a large number of prisoners of war poured into several newly established prisoner camps in the Soviet Union in a short time. Within more than ten days, the number of prisoners of war received by some POW camps was close to the amount specified in the plan. According to the materials reported by each POW camp, kozelisk camp plans to receive 10000 people by October 1, and 8843 people by October 3; The old biersk camp plans to receive 8000 people, 7045 on October 14 and 11262 on November 16; Ostashkov camp plans to receive 10000 people by October 1, and 8731 people by September 30, but the distribution station will send 5000 people here. It was only with the repeated insistence of the camp leaders that these prisoners of war were transferred to other camps. By October 29, the camp had 12235 prisoners of war. Others greatly exceeded the original amount. The camp was originally scheduled to receive 6000 people until October 25, but there were 11640 prisoners of war here from October 1 to 4; Olan camp was originally scheduled to accommodate only 4000 people, but actually received 7063 people from October 1 to 3. ЦХИДК (historical document collection and custody center), ф one п,оп two е,д 2, л 242。

although the order to launch the POW camps was issued on September 19, the preparations for the POW camps have not been completed, or rather, the preparations made by the battalions have become stretched and difficult to cope with in the face of a large influx of POWs. This has directly led to the passivity and confusion of the reception work in the POW camps. By the end of September, the pow quarters in the puzivli POW camp “were still built with boards, with no gaps, ceiling and stove”; “There is no disinfection room in the camp and prisoners of war have no underwear”; What’s more serious is that “the normal diet of prisoners of war was not arranged” because the transfer order was not issued. The ostashkov camp, built on the island, had no telephone contact with the outside of the island, so the use of oil for motor boats could not be guaranteed, so “the supply of materials has been interrupted”; Materials such as wood, linoleum, nails, etc. for the maintenance of prisoners’ houses are lacking; There is still a shortage of 8000 mattresses in the whole camp, which can only be allocated by the state, because “it is neither possible nor material to sew such a large number of mattresses in the local organization”.

many buildings in kozelysansk camp “are in a semi damaged state. There is no glass on the windows, the roof leaks, and the connecting shops cannot be erected”. Even such houses can only arrange half of the prisoners of war, and the other prisoners of war either sleep in summer tents or are placed in pig pens.

many prisoners of war in the yukhnov camp had to “live on the balcony, in stables and shacks” under the temperature of 3 ℃ ~ 7 ℃. Even “many people can hardly find a place to sit”.

in order to solve the problem of accommodation, some prisoners of war camps made simple arrangements and proposed to build three and four beds. Soplunenko reluctantly agreed to make three beds where the room space allowed.

with the end of military operations, how to deal with a large number of Polish prisoners of war requires the leaders of the Soviet Union to make an immediate decision. On October 1, a committee led by central Secretary zhidanov discussed the issue of prisoners of war. Obviously, during the discussion, some people believed that Kulik’s proposal to demobilize soldiers and prisoners of war, which was once endorsed by Voroshilov, was an effective way to alleviate the pressure in the prison camp under the current circumstances. In the report jointly submitted to Stalin after the meeting by belia and Mehlis, members of the committee, it is suggested to classify prisoners of war. They basically divided prisoners of war into six categories and made different treatments: Ukraine living in western Ukraine and Western BelarusThe classification of prisoners of war by using

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according to the resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Brazzaville) on October 2, 1939 was basically over by late November. As mentioned earlier, the repatriation of prisoners of war of soldiers living in western Ukraine and Western Belarus proceeded smoothly. The preparations for the release of Czech prisoners of war were completed by the Soviet Union at the end of October, but when the released Czechs asked to enter Romania, the Romanian government did not immediately issue them visas. The visa problem was not solved until the spring of 1941.

also started the repatriation of Polish prisoners of war living in the areas occupied by Germany and the reception of some polish prisoners of war from Germany in mid October. On October 11, belia suggested in a letter to Molotov that “it is appropriate to transfer about 33000 captured soldiers living in the German part of the former Poland to the German authorities recently, and negotiations should be started with the German government for this purpose.”

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vice foreign people’s committee member Bo Jiangjin and German ambassador to the Soviet Union Schulenberg held negotiations on the handover procedures. The two sides agreed that the handover work would begin on October 23 and is expected to be completed on November 3. By November 23, the Soviet side had handed over 42492 Polish prisoners of war to the German side and accepted 13757 prisoners of war from the German side.

in November and December of the same year, the Soviet Union also completed the work of receiving Polish prisoners of war from Lithuania. According to statistics provided by the Lithuanian government, nearly 14000 Polish prisoners of war were detained there, including 3000 military officers. The Lithuanian government offered to return the prisoners of War born in western Ukraine and Western Belarus to their birthplace.

on November 9, the Political Bureau and the people’s Committee adopted resolutions respectively, “to receive from the Lithuanian government former Polish Army prisoners detained in Lithuania, living in western Ukraine and Western Belarus and willing to return home”. Repatriate the soldiers and junior officers received; Officers, police and officials sent to the prison camp for “careful examination”; However, this provision “shall be strictly confidential”.

when this work was completed, 21 officers and 54 policemen were sent to the yukhnov camp.

compared with the returned prisoners of war, the situation of those prisoners of war who were left to use their labor force was much worse. The 25000 prisoners of war who were first determined to remain were used to build the koletz Lvov road in the new town of vorensky. The Rovno camp, which gathered half of these prisoners of war, was changed into the first construction camp of the Ministry of the people’s Committee of the interior.

the scope of use of prisoners of war labor expanded rapidly. On October 14, the administration of prisoners of war signed an agreement on the use of prisoners of war with the people’s Committee of ferrous metallurgy of the Soviet Union. More than 10000 prisoners of war were arranged to work in 8 mining bureaus, mines and railway companies under the people’s Committee of ferrous metallurgy. These prisoners of war were mainly concentrated in three camps in the south of the Russian Federation, namely, krivorog camp in Dnepropetrovsk state, yeleno karakub camp in Donetsk state and zaporoke camp in zaporoke state. Each camp set up many sub camps in the location of mines and enterprises. Although according to the agreement, the labor protection, wages and living conditions of these prisoners of war will be equal to or close to those of ordinary employees, the difference is that they still have to work under the custody of guards.

this means that they are not ordinary workers, but workers who are forced to accept labor.

whether it is road construction or mining, the work of prisoners of war is quite hard and heavy. Documents have confirmed that the enterprises of the people’s Ministry of ferrous metallurgy have not fulfilled the terms stipulated in the agreement and have not created due living and working conditions for prisoners of war. The discontent of prisoners of war of

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was also exacerbated by the integration of western Ukraine and Western Belarus into the Soviet Union in early November. The prisoners of war living in the two regions naturally believed that they had become citizens of the Soviet Union and that their detention and use as prisoners of war violated the relevant decrees of the Supreme Soviet. They jointly wrote to Stalin to express their strong desire to return to their hometown and reunite with their families. Many prisoners of war in

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also left the construction site without reply. According to the report of major fedukov, the commander of No. 1 road construction project in western Ukraine, more than 1000 prisoners of war escaped from the whole road construction site in early November, accounting for almost 10% of the number of prisoners of war working here.

although the working and living conditions of prisoners of war have been improved and vigilance has been strengthened, the phenomenon of escape has not been completely stopped. This shows that the dissatisfaction of prisoners of war is not only aimed at living and working conditions, but also difficult for them to accept the discriminatory treatment in politics.

considering that the large number of prisoners of war escaping may cause “dissatisfaction” in the areas newly incorporated into the Soviet Union, and provide bullets for the enemy’s anti Soviet propaganda “

on December 2, the people’s Committee of ferrous metallurgy and the people’s Committee of the interior jointly issued an order to stipulate new methods for the use of prisoners of war working in various enterprises. The new method stipulates that “all prisoners of war who have the ability to work shall be used in basic projects, and their wages shall be changed to the same piece rate as that of non military employees. The incomplete labor force of prisoners of war shall be arranged and used within the prison camp and in the logistics work of industrial and mining enterprises, and their hourly wages shall be determined according to the current hourly wage system of the industrial department.” The new approach also requires the immediate identification of those who have production skills and are politically qualified in order to “be permanent workers in your enterprise”. The custody of prisoners of war who often exceed the production quota may be revoked after special examination and approval of the prisoners of war Administration Bureau of the Ministry of internal affairs. The method also stipulates that the minimum daily living expenses of prisoners of war shall not be less than 5 rubles. The daily living expenses set for prisoners and detainees in the Department of the people’s Committee of the interior in February 1938 can be used as a reference for this standard. In the “Gulag” system, prisons and immigration camps average 3 rubles and 49 Gobi per person per day, construction camps 3 rubles and 90 Gobi, detainees 5 rubles and 11 Gobi, and children’s correctional camps 7 rubles and 58 Gobi. Свободнаямысль,2003,№3, с 105。; In addition, it is necessary to “create necessary production conditions (fixed working place, systematic guidance, etc.), cultural and living conditions, and carry out interpretation work to ensure that all prisoners of war can complete the production quota”, etc.

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although the treatment of prisoners of war stipulated in the new method of use is better than before, the status of prisoners of war has not been fundamentally solved, that is to say, these people are still the labor force who have lost their freedom and are forced to work. At the same time, from the regulation to the implementation of the new treatment, there is also a process to determine its length according to the degree of responsibility and the completeness of the inspection and supervision mechanism. When their demands were not met and they could not get a satisfactory explanation, prisoners of war slowed down, absenteeism or even fled under various excuses, which became their common means of resistance. Nearly 100 prisoners of war who work in zaporoze do not work every day for various reasons. Among the prisoners of war who work, slow work and alcoholism are common, so that sometimes the piece rate wage per day is as high as 30 ~ 40 rubles and as low as 23 Gobi. Three other prisoners escaped.

when the Ministry of the people’s Committee of the interior sent special forces to strengthen the custody and arrested 16 prisoners of war who were considered to be the instigator and organizer of sabotage, it aroused stronger resistance among the prisoners of war. In late January 1940, no more than 370 of the 1570 prisoners of war worked every day; Many prisoners of war declared a hunger strike. Their main request is to let them go home.

on December 20, 1939, prisoners of war working in the “nicopol manganese mine” and “October mining” trust in Stalin state went on strike and hunger strike, which intensified until Beria was disturbed. On December 31, he specially ordered tishkov, director of the first division (secret service) of the pow Administration Bureau, together with the special commissioner of the General Administration of economic management of the Ministry of the people’s Committee of the interior and the director of the Stalin State Bureau of the Ministry of the people’s Committee of the interior, to investigate and investigate the “large number of non work” and “escape events” of prisoners of war working in local enterprises.

on January 3, 1940, hohlov, deputy director of the prisoner of war administration, wrote a special report on this matter. Among the reasons for the strike and hunger strike of prisoners of war in the above two enterprises, one thing is the same, that is, the prisoners of war asked to release them home like most captured soldiers.

khohlov reported that coercive measures were taken against prisoners of war who resisted, “reducing food and depriving them of the right to communication”; And “remove 250 production saboteurs and send them to ostashkov prison camp”; Create better living conditions for “honest prisoners of war”. On the other hand, the Ministry of the people’s Committee of the interior and the Ministry of the people’s Committee of the ferrous metallurgy industry signed a new agreement on the use of prisoners of war again on February 7, reducing the number of prisoners of war and dividing the prisoners of war into two categories: the wage system is clearly stipulated for one category, and the minimum wage per day is also 2 rubles higher than that stipulated on October 14; The POW camp also defines the corresponding guarantee for the life and treatment of prisoners of war.

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prisoners of war in labor camps became the main source of troops of the Polish Army established on the territory of the Soviet Union after the outbreak of the Soviet German war.

the Soviet Union’s treatment of the occupied Polish territory

as the Soviet and German military operations in Poland came to an end, the Soviet Union’s treatment of the occupied territory began immediately. The first step in this treatment is to further determine the areas occupied by both sides in the “former Polish territory” with Germany.

in the secret additional protocol to the Soviet German non aggression treaty signed on August 23, 1939, although Soviet Germany defined the sphere of influence in Poland, it was not finalized on whether to maintain an independent Polish state and how to delimit its borders, but “it can only be determined in the process of further political development”. The dispatch of the Soviet Union and the rapid collapse of Poland under the joint attack of the Soviet Union and Germany have made significant changes in the “political development” on this issue. It is increasingly urgent for the leaders of the Soviet Union and Germany to solve the above “remaining problems”.

on September 19, Molotov said in the name of Stalin that the Soviet Union gave up the idea of “allowing the remaining part of Poland to exist independently” and agreed to divide Poland by the Soviet and German countries along the line of Pisa River narev River Vistula River San river.

when reporting to Ribbentrop, Schulenberg believed that the Soviet Union’s proposition was “completely in line with the German point of view”.

but the German leaders hope to get more. The oil field near Lvov, the railway between Lvov and chernovce and Lithuania are all necessary for attacking the Baltic Sea and the Soviet Union in the future. Ribbentrop also demanded that the upper reaches of the San River and augustov and their forests be included in Germany.

the Soviet Union did not comply with the requirements of Germany. It insisted that the upper reaches of the Sang river had always been the territory of Ukrainians, “no government can disappoint it”; In the internal documents of the Soviet Union, augustov province is “of primary significance to the Soviet Union” from the perspective of nationality, economy and defense. The Soviet Union also asked Germany to transfer the occupied Vilnius region to Lithuania in exchange for the latter’s surrender of helmshenno, including parts of Lublin and Warsaw provinces.

in order to finally determine the partition of Poland, Molotov and ribentrov held negotiations in Moscow from September 27 to 28, and Stalin and Schulenburg also participated in the talks. The result of the negotiations between the two sides was the signing of the Soviet German friendship and border treaty and three secret supplementary protocols. The treaty signed by the two countries points out that “after the collapse of the former Polish state, the Soviet government and the German government believe that it is their task to restore peace and order in this territory and ensure that the people of all ethnic groups living there can live in peace in accordance with their national characteristics”. To this end, they will determine “the border in line with the national interests of both sides”, and both sides recognize this border as the final border and exclude any interference from the third party; The necessary national transformation in the territory west of the determined “boundary line” shall be carried out byThe German government carried out the transformation of the territory to the east of the line by the Soviet government “; The two sides believed that “the above transformation is a reliable basis for further developing the friendly relations between the people of the Soviet Union and the people of Germany”. The “secret Supplementary Protocol” signed by

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involves the relocation of residents, the reconstruction of administrative institutions and the obligations of both parties in their respective occupied areas. The protocol adjusted the scope of interests defined by the two sides in the “secret Supplementary Protocol” of the Soviet German non aggression treaty, and included Lithuania into the scope of interests of the Soviet Union. The two sides also made it clear that each party “will not allow any Polish propaganda against the territory of the other party in its own territory. The two sides will eliminate the germination of such propaganda in their own territory and inform each other of the appropriate measures taken to this end.”

on October 4, the representatives of the two countries signed a supplementary protocol to adjust the above-mentioned border, which described the border carefully.

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through these documents, the Soviet Union and Germany not only determined the scope and boundary of their respective interests in Polish territory, but also undertook the task of “transforming” the areas within their respective interests and protecting each other’s interests. When referring to Poland, the document carefully selects the reference to “former Poland”, which is intended to emphasize that the two countries have divided up a piece of “ownerless” land. Moreover, they clearly described the delimited boundary as the final boundary and excluded the interference of other countries. Their intention is to emphasize that their forcible occupation and partition of Poland is not an illegal action. On the contrary, who wants to object to this is an illegal interference in the interests of the two countries. However, the treaty has not aroused a positive response in the international community.

in order to legalize the occupied areas, the second step of the Soviet Union was to start the legal procedures of domestic law to identify and protect this result. On October 1, 1939, the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Bolshevik) adopted a resolution to hold a people’s conference simultaneously in Lvov, western Ukraine and biavistock, Western Belarus on October 26. The people’s conference should confirm the political and socio-economic changes that have taken place in these two regions after September 17 and adopt a resolution to join the Soviet Union. All relevant documents are prepared by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus.

in order to elect representatives to the people’s Congress, elections will be held in western Ukraine and Western Belarus on October 22. Candidates can only be selected from the provisional institutions established in urban and rural areas – the municipal provisional management committee, the village farmers’ committee and the workers’ Red Guard. The regional provisional institutions are composed of four people: two from the Communist Party organization, one from the people’s Committee for internal affairs and one from the regional urban management committee.

on the 27th, the people’s assembly of western Ukraine issued a notice on the state power of western Ukraine in Lvov, announced the establishment of Soviet power in the whole territory of western Ukraine, and made a request to join the Soviet Ukrainian Republic on the same day. Two days after

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, the people’s assembly of Western Belarus also issued a document basically consistent with the above contents in biavistock.

on November 1 and 2, the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union issued decrees to meet the requests of the people’s conferences of the above two regions. On November 14 and 15, the supreme Soviets of Belarus and Ukraine issued decrees to accept the two regions to join the corresponding republics.

on December 20, the presidium of the Supreme Soviet issued a decree confirming all citizens living in Ukraine and Western Belarus before November 1 and 2, 1939 as Soviet citizens. However, in the note of the people’s Committee for foreign affairs of the Soviet Union on December 1, 1941, it was said that the Soviet government was willing to treat the Polish people living in these two regions before November 1-2, 1939 as Polish citizens as an exception. So far, after these legal procedures, the two regions have officially become part of the Soviet Union, and the existing residents of the two regions have become Soviet citizens with Soviet nationality. It was also during this period that the prisoner camps began to release a large number of Ukrainian and Belarusian soldiers and prisoners of war living in these two regions. The coincidence of time between the two makes people have reason to believe that the release of prisoners of war is also a “cooperative action”.

in a very short period of time, the Soviet Union unilaterally transformed the problems that were originally international problems into internal affairs, and found a legal basis for evidence, and only it had the power of interpretation. This method of grafting flowers and trees made the Soviet Union get rid of its passive position on this issue, and gradually formed its principled position on this issue, that is, to safeguard the right of Ukrainian and Belarusian compatriots to claim national unity and insist that the Soviet Polish border should be determined on the basis of the current situation after September 17, 1939. The Soviet Union hardly gave up this principled position, and it became more and more unshakable later. Its connotation is also expanding, including not only territorial issues, but also ethnic issues, the national self-esteem of Ukrainians and Belarusians, and the honor of the Soviet government. Thus, around this issue, the principled differences between the Soviet Union and the Polish government in exile and its supporters were very clear and sharp from the beginning.

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the establishment of Soviet system in the areas incorporated into the Soviet Union, or the implementation of “Sovietization”, is another important step for the Soviet Union to deal with these two places. While the Red Army troops were advancing towards western Ukraine and Western Belarus, a group of Party and Soviet staff selected by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and Belarus also followed the troops into the two regions. Each group of 15-20 people is responsible for establishing new management institutions in the cities and rural areas occupied by the Soviet army and organizing the “workers’ Red Guard”. On the one hand, they maintain local public security and, on the other hand, track down the hidden officers, landlords, police and key officials of government agencies. Many of those caught by them were executed on the spot.

the Ministry of the people’s Committee of the interior sent a special action team to lead and participate in the “inventory” activities. Only the first action team was in joeltkuv, gorerotz, kromeyo, ksov and StanisIn the framework of the Soviet Union’s future settlement of the Polish issue, this principle has been further processed and fine tuned, and has become the “kosong line” repeatedly adhered to by the Soviet Union, and has become the most important part of the Soviet Union’s settlement of the Polish issue.

however, the Soviet Union’s treatment of the occupied territories undoubtedly has a strong color of power, and it has no sufficient international legal basis for the integration of these regions. As the representative of the Polish state in the international community, the Polish government in exile naturally refused to recognize the results of such treatment. Even after the formation of the anti fascist alliance, there were disputes on this issue among the anti fascist powers. Accepting or opposing the Soviet Union’s “Komatsu line” is one of the problems that have to be faced but are not easy to solve, both for the Soviet and polish governments and for the international community.

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Polish officers and soldiers detained after classified treatment of

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as mentioned earlier, during the 12 day operation after the Soviet Union sent troops to Poland, nearly 250000 Polish officers and soldiers were captured by the Soviet army, most of which were escorted to eight prisoner camps and two distribution stations on the territory of the Soviet Union. In early October,

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classified these Polish prisoners of war after the same resolution was made by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Bolshevik) and the people’s Committee of the Soviet Union. Some soldiers and prisoners of war who originally lived in western Ukraine and Western Belarus were repatriated home; Soldiers and prisoners of war living in areas occupied by Germany are waiting to be returned to the German authorities; A group of prisoners of war were left to engage in construction work; Officers, military and political officials, spies, anti espionage personnel, gendarmerie, prison officials and police among prisoners of war shall be detained in designated prisoner of war camps. It was this latter kind of people who became the silent protagonist in the so-called “Katyn incident”. Many achievements have been made in the investigation and research of the “Katyn incident” abroad.

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. The earliest description of the incident is the official materials of the Katyn massacre (amtliches material zum massenmordvon Katyn) published by the German information administration in September 1943, which is a detailed summary of the evidence collected in Germany. Facts and documents concerning principals of war, captured by the USSR, the 1939 campaign, compiled in 1944 by aspecial Commission under the Council of the Minister of the Polish government exile, edited in London in 1944, also put forward a large number of materials on the incident. The most detailed investigation material on the Katyn incident is the hearing for the Select Committee to conduct an investigation of the facts, evidence, and circulation of the Katyn Forest mass published by the editor of the special committee of the United States Congress, a total of seven volumes, which was published in 1952. Works related to the Katyn incident include Joseph mackiewicz, the Katyn woodmurders, London: Hollis & Carter, 1951; J. outouvidisand Jaime Reynolds, Poland, 1939-1947, New York: Holmes & Meier, 1986; George v. acewicz, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the political government exile (1939-1945), the American Association for the advancement of Slavic Studies, 1979., However, due to the lack of real materials from the Soviet Union, the decision-making process of the Soviet authorities on this issue is not explained very clearly. Since the 1990s, Russia has successively declassified a large number of files about Polish prisoners of war in the Soviet Union and their treatment, making it possible for people to know the truth more directly. Based on the declassified files of Russia in recent years, through the analysis of the decision-making process of the Soviet authorities in dealing with Polish prisoners of war, this paper explores the deep causes of this tragic event in the history of Soviet Polish relations.

according to the order of the Soviet authorities, the generals, officers, military and political dignitaries, spies, anti spies, gendarmeries, prison officials and police among the prisoners should be concentrated in the designated three special prisoner of war camps of old belisk, kozelisk and ostashkov. See( ПихояР Hold, КозловВ Holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leop Катынь,с 120,157,161。) At the beginning of November 1939, the corresponding transfer was carried out and soon completed. From then on until the spring of 1940, the three camps and their detainees remained stable.

the old biersk and kozelisk battalions are basically the former officers of the Polish army. Their ranks vary from general to captain. In addition, there are some military technicians, such as military doctors, professors, journalists, painters and military priests. Ostashkov camp mainly holds espionage personnel, anti espionage personnel, gendarmerie, prison officials, police, police spies, as well as activists of anti Soviet political parties and groups, landlords, dukes, factory owners, settlers and refugees. The situation of prisoners in the three special prisoner of war camps is shown in the table below. Table data from( ЛебедеваН Embrace атынь:преступлениепротивчеловечества,Москва:Культура, 1994, с 325-328。)

Table 1 list of prisoners of war held in the old belsk prisoner of war camp from November 1939 to March 1940 (omitted, please refer to the original book)

Table 2 list of war prisoners held in kozelisk prisoner of war camp from November 1939 to March 1940 (omitted, please refer to the original book)

Table 3 list of prisoners of war held in ostashkov prisoner of war camp from November 1939 to March 1940 (omitted, please check the original book). The number of prisoners held in the three special prisoner of war camps

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basically remained stable at the end of November 1939, which shows that the centralized work of this group of “special” prisoners of war has been completed in less than one month. Statistics on December 31, 1939 showed that 15087 people were held in the above three prisoner of war camps. By February 4 of the following year, the number decreased slightly to 14990. After the Political Bureau made the final decision on their treatment on March 5, the number was 14 on March 16854 people. However, this is not the last number to be executed.

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as the management of prisoners of war is gradually on the right track, at the beginning, the common living treatment problems reflected in the three prisoner camps are gradually reduced, and another kind of problems, that is, prisoners of war’s demand for fair political treatment, are increasingly prominent.

prisoners of war questioned their detention as prisoners of war. On October 20, 1939, general Fu Yu Sikorski, who had commanded the battle of Lvov in September 1939 and then surrendered to the Soviet army, wrote to the commander of the Ukrainian front army timoshingo from the prison camp of old belsk, saying that he and his subordinates ignored “the written proposal given to us by the German command promised us the most favorable conditions for surrender”, Instead of taking a step back from their offensive front, they did not hesitate to negotiate with the Soviet army because “your country, contrary to Germany, guarantees the principle of justice to all ethnic groups and individuals”. He drew timoshingo’s attention to the fact that “the delay in our release has put all of us and our families in an extremely difficult situation” and that “we are extremely distressed by being held in old belsk and the restrictions on personal freedom here”. He hoped that the Soviet side would “take all possible measures to make us free as soon as possible”. The status of prisoners of war in the “spkds” camp and the “spkds” camp of Poland was determined in accordance with the requirements of the “Colonel’s” spkds “on July 1940. This time they put forward bluntly: “please explain to us what the Soviet government thinks of us, specifically: do you think we are prisoners of war?” If it is considered that “we request to treat us in accordance with the norms recognized by governments for the treatment of prisoners of war”, we should first “make it possible for us to freely seek access to the embassy authorized to the Soviet government and responsible for protecting the interests of Polish citizens and thus the interests of prisoners of war”, “establish contact with the Red Cross and make it possible for us to communicate with our families outside the Soviet Union”, And publish the list of prisoners of war, release the prisoners of war of retired and reserve soldiers who are not enlisted, and pay appropriate allowances. If the Soviet government thought they were arrested, “please inform us what crime we were deprived of liberty for, and please formally prosecute us”. If they are arrested (detained), “please explain to us which of our actions led to the restriction of our freedom, and we were arrested on Polish territory”. During the period when they were captured by the Soviet Union’s “spekds” and “spekds”, they were sent to the “spekds doctors” and “spekds doctors” in accordance with the provisions of the International Convention on the rights of the Soviet Union’s “spekds”.

however, these appeals and requests were either rejected or not responded to by the Soviet authorities.

another way to demand fair treatment is to resist and resist the detention system. Lieutenant may yo Everett, major Lu Ya DOmel and s ya kvoleg of the old bielsk camp organized a “cultural learning activity” group to encourage “talking in Polish only” and “not working in the POW camp”, “The worse the situation in the prison camp, the better it is for us – so that we can make a fool of the prison camp management and the prison camp system in front of the upcoming international investigation team.”. These remarks were characterized as “carrying out counter revolutionary activities aimed at opposing the internal system of the prison camp and the management authority of the prison camp” in the reporting materials of the prison camp and the notification of the prison administration bureau.

in ostashkov camp, some prisoners of war are proud to be in the confinement room and can “not work and persuade others not to work”, which is almost “credit” to their “colleagues”.

according to the statistics of the camp in the first half of January 1940, there were 75 violations of the prisoner of war camp system, of which about 15 refused to work.

in kozelisk camp, a large number of prisoners of war began a hunger strike on January 21, 1940. Although the cause of the hunger strike was the poor quality of food in the prison camp and the consumption of spoiled food for prisoners of war, the direct cause of this situation was the interruption of the supply to the prison camp by the relevant departments of the Soviet Union. According to Ma Alekseyev, political commissar of the prison camp, the superior did not send food to the camp in time in January and was not allowed to receive meat in a centralized way. “All this not only worsened the food of prisoners of war, but also almost threatened to interrupt the food of prisoners of war”.

and some prisoners of war secretly prepared to escape. On February 19, 1940, the head of the second section of the special department of the general security administration of the Ministry of internal affairs of the Soviet Union, lorkish, reported that a series of facts of trying to escape from the prison camp in ostashkov were found in the prison camp. Some prisoners of war planned to escape from the prison camp in the summer, and their preferred destination was Finland, because “it is at war with the Soviet Union. If we appear on Finnish territory, let alone we are still officers, the Finns will not betray us. On the contrary, they will accept us to join the army and entrust us with officer positions”. To this end, the prisoners of war managed to buy a map, “began to study the terrain of the Western Soviet Union, that is, the places they passed when they fled from the prison camp”, “and marked all settlements, roads and railways leading to the former border between Poland and Finland”. When discussing the plan to escape from the prison camp, some prisoners of war thought that they needed to escape by truck, because no one would carefully check when the truck left the prison camp. In addition to preparing to carry out single person and group escape, some prisoners of war also attempted to organize all prisoners of war to escape on a large scale. Therefore, the guard of the prisoner of war camp should be eliminated.

in response to this situation, deputy internal affairs people’s commissar melkulov instructed the director of the pow administration soplunenko: “take measures to strengthen security and get rid of the ringleaders.”

was also found in the kozelisk camp.

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prisoners of War showed patriotism, which also received great attention from the Soviet prisoners of war administration. There are many such cases in the materials reported by the POW camps. While the prisoners were talkingHe believed that “Poland will still exist like Poland in the past”. They hoped that Britain and France would help “Poland revive”, care about what kind of foreign policy “Poland will implement in the future”, and expressed their respect for the soldiers who “are fighting for Poland’s independence”.

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are easily associated with this patriotism, which is dissatisfaction with the Soviet Union. At that time, some of the Soviet Union’s prisoners of war were integrated into the Soviet Union’s foreign imperialist policy; In a sarcastic tone, they asked the political instructor of the prison camp, “if you don’t pursue an aggressive policy, why fight with Finland?” “Why has such a big country fought such a long war with a small country like Finland?” Some prisoners of war edited newspapers “full of anti Soviet spirit” and read them secretly among prisoners of war.

it should be pointed out that the above situation is not a common phenomenon in the prison camps, or a problem of universal significance reflected in the report materials of each prison camp. Because of the above words and deeds, a small proportion of people were dealt with by the prison camp management. However, quantity is not the whole of a problem. It is on these issues that do not seem to be common that they collectively represent and reflect the contradiction between the Soviet prisoner of war management system and polish prisoners of war. After the “classified treatment” of prisoners of war, from the political point of view of the Soviet Union, the personnel remaining in the three special prisoners of war camps are the most reactionary and dangerous. This doomed these prisoners of war to become the focus of control under the Soviet prisoner of war management system and the biggest victim of this system. When the Soviet Union has completed the partition of Poland and insisted that the former Polish state no longer exists, the basic starting point of controlling these Polish prisoners of war is to make them lose the ability to revive “landlord and bourgeois Poland”. Even statements that reflect this desire and actions that illustrate the potential ability in this regard will pose a threat to the current situation of the Soviet Union, which is not allowed by this system. In this regard, the administration of prisoners of war should take various means – including recruiting spies among prisoners of war. On October 8, 1939, belia instructed all prisoners of war camps to establish an undercover intelligence network among prisoners of war “in order to find out the situation of counter revolutionary organizations among prisoners of war and master the feelings of prisoners of war”. At the same time, the spy also reported the situation of the “interested persons” of the Soviet authorities and was responsible for “identifying and preventing the attempts of prisoners of war to escape from the prison camp”. ПихояР Hold, КозловВ Holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leop Катынь,с 135-136。, To grasp the ideological trends and underground activities of prisoners of war, and severely deal with the “anti Soviet and counter revolutionary elements” found. From the perspective of these prisoners of war, their personal freedom and political freedom have been restricted to the greatest extent. The reason why “deprivation” is not used here is that the prisoners of war still retain a little conditional “freedom”, such as the monthly communication that passes the prisoner of War review. In addition, their personal belongings exceeding the regulations are not “confiscated” but “kept” by the POW camp., It was hard for the prisoners of war to accept it. The reason is very simple. They believe that the reason why they fall into the current situation is not because they fought with the Soviet Union, but just the opposite; The reason why they were not released was not that each of them had current anti Soviet activities, but only their original occupation and title. In addition, the prisoners of war in these three camps have a relatively high level of education, which enables them to think about their current situation and the fate of the country, the situation of the war and various relations with the political system of the Soviet Union from a deeper level, so as to have a stronger patriotism and the desire to revive the Polish country. This feeling and desire, as well as the words and deeds triggered by it, is precisely what the Soviet prisoner of war management system should strictly guard against, and it is also not allowed by the Soviet political system. The contradictions reflected in these three POW camps are not only the contradictions between prisoners and detainees, but much broader and deeper.

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if further analyzed, it is not difficult to see that the Soviet prisoner of war administration is undoubtedly in the dominant position of this pair of contradictions. It has the decisive power to choose the way to solve contradictions. Or rather, this power is in the hands of the supreme decision-makers of the Soviet Union led by Stalin. The system of the Soviet Union at that time provided the possibility that they could use this power only by personal will without any sufficient reason and argument, including choosing to use it in the most extreme and intense way. Under such a system, being placed in such a contradictory opposite, for these Polish prisoners of war, the tragedy that happened to the vast majority of them is actually irresistible.

the Soviet Finnish war and Beria’s instructions

on November 28, 1939, the Soviet Union announced the abolition of the Soviet Finnish non aggression treaty signed in 1932. The next day, the Soviet Union recalled its ambassador to Finland and declared to sever diplomatic relations with Finland. The deteriorating Soviet Finnish relations finally broke down completely. On the 30th, the Soviet army began to attack Finland, and the Soviet Finnish war broke out.

this is the second large-scale military operation of the Soviet Union against neighboring countries in two and a half months after sending troops to Poland in September. Although no other country cooperated with Germany this time, the Soviet leaders still believed that they could win the war again in a short time. For details on the Soviet political and military leaders’ estimation of Finland’s resistance and the specific military action plan formulated, see the works jointly prepared by Russian and Finnish scholars. According to the Convention, the Soviet Union will have to face the problem of a large number of prisoners of war again. In order to make early preparations for the reception of prisoners of war, belia signed an order on December 1, specifying the establishment of nine prisoner reception stations in Murmansk state, Karelia Soviet Autonomous Republic and Leningrad state; It also asked Yuza, yukhnov, putivli, temnikov of the Autonomous Republic of Moldova, griazovitz of Vologda Prefecture and other prisoner of war camps and Karaganda labor camp of the Ministry of the people’s Committee of the interior to prepare for the placement of 26500 prisoners of war.

the first few POW camps have just disposed of the vast majority of Polish prisoners held here and received some Finnish prisoners of War (11000 according to Beria’s order), learn about the espionage and intelligence work carried out by the special section of ostashkov concentration camp in accordance with the order of the Ministry of internal affairs of the Soviet Union on October 8, 1939. “Pay attention to the quality of existing intelligence work and the reliability of comprehensive analysis of the emotions of various prisoners of war based on it”. In addition, belia also asked to check the contact between prisoners of war and outside the camp, do a good job in the work of the prison camp registration authority, ensure the quality of registration, the security status of the prison camp and the discipline of prisoners of war.

on the same day, belia ordered nehrosev, political commissar of the pow administration, rodiononov, director of the second Department of the General Administration of economic management of the Ministry of internal affairs, to go to old bersk, and ordered yo mi polushin, deputy director of the pow administration, and ya a yorsh, director of the first Department of the General Administration of economic management of the Ministry of internal affairs, to go to kozelisk, Its mission is basically the same as soprinenko.

belia set up a public movement and sent “dignitaries” to the POW camp in person for more than just inspection. It can be seen from belia’s instructions that the Ministry of the people’s Committee of the interior is really concerned about two things: first, sorting out the investigation files and registration materials of prisoners of war; Second, the progress of finding and developing espionage personnel among prisoners of war. For the former, the process of investigation and registration is the process of determining the true identity of prisoners of war, verifying their previous work experience, and discovering and exposing the so-called “counter revolutionary organizations and activities” among prisoners of war. In particular, the latter link can provide a “convincing” basis for the final decision on the fate of prisoners of war at the special session. In other words, what Beria wants is the “materials” submitted to the special session. It is secondary to how true and accurate these materials will be when they are sorted out within the time he has set – before the end of January. As far as the second thing is concerned, it is related to and different from completing the previous work. In the above order, Beria mentioned an instruction he issued on October 8. In this “instruction on the business and counter insurgency work of the POW camps of the people’s Committee of the interior of the Soviet Union in the POW camps”, it was stipulated that “a spy intelligence network should be established in the POW camps to find out the situation of the counter revolutionary organizations among the POWs and master the emotions of the POWs”, Intelligence agencies should identify and pay special attention to some specific personnel. In the instructions, these personnel are divided into nine categories, namely, former Polish intelligence personnel, personnel of secret agencies, police, prison officials, border guards, intelligence personnel, members of Polish military fascist and nationalist organizations, staff of courts and procuratorates, spies of foreign intelligence agencies, and members of overseas White Russian terrorist groups, Spies of the former tsarist Russian secret service, spies of the Polish Communist Party, rich peasants and anti Soviet elements who fled from the Soviet Union to Poland., All discovered counter revolutionaries should be registered immediately, spy files should be established for them, and the counter revolutionary organizations among prisoners of war and their contacts with foreign countries should be exposed.

therefore, the implementation of this instruction itself serves the first task. At the same time, we can also test the existing intelligence network, so as to find some valuable intelligence personnel to work for the Ministry of the people’s Committee of the interior. This is also a further treatment of prisoners of war. Although only a small number of prisoners of war are involved, this work is of no less significance and importance to belia and his department.

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put it bluntly, these two things are the “go” and “stay” of these Polish prisoners of war, that is, which prisoners of war should be removed from the prison camp and which prisoners of war can stay and continue to play a role. They are related to the fate of each prisoner of war held in the three special prisoner of war camps, which will be preliminarily decided by the staff of the Ministry of the interior, large and small, from Moscow within a month. Of course, the final judgment should also be passed through the special meeting of the Ministry of internal affairs, but you should know that the special meeting only makes a judgment in the face of the sorted out materials.

it is hard to say how much the order issued by belia on the last day of 1939 has to do with the ongoing Soviet Finnish war. Just two days before belia issued the above instructions, the pow Administration reported to the Deputy people’s member of the interior, VA VA chernesov, that six POW camps with a capacity of 27000 Finnish prisoners of war had been prepared according to belia’s order, and the other three camps could also receive prisoners of war soon. However, because there are few Finnish prisoners of War (150), the prisoners of war Administration requested approval to retain the full staffing of only two camps, and only 10% ~ 20% of the staffing of other camps.

that is to say, the issue of vacating camps for new prisoners of war is not urgent now. The Soviet Finnish war may only be an opportunity. Its role here was to attract the attention of Soviet leaders to polish prisoners of war, and in connection with various resistance phenomena in various prisoner camps, began to comprehensively and thoroughly solve the problem of Polish prisoners of war. Other measures related to this include the resolution adopted by the Political Bureau on December 3, 1939 to arrest all the registered basic officers of the former Polish army; Request that Polish officers, police and prison officials outside the three special prisoner of war camps be sent to kozelisk camp and ostashkov camp; Send a group of prisoners of war awaiting further investigation to the place of arrest; On December 31, belia ordered the director of the first division of the prisoners of war administration, A. wa tishkov, to go to yeleno karakub camp to investigate the strike and escape of prisoners of war there and arrest the leaders.

however, only from Beria’s order, it is impossible to see how the Soviet authorities are going to solve the problem of “going” of prisoners of war. Judging from the previous results, even the files sent to the special session, a considerable number of parties saved their lives. For example, the special session in 1938 sent 36865 people to reform through labor camps and 109327 people in 1939. ГАРФ (State Archives of the Russian Federation), Ф. 9414, по. 1, д 1155, л 8。 That is to say, there is an indispensable “link” between the dispatch of Ministry of internal affairs staff from belia to the three special prisoner of war camps and the decision to impose capital punishment on the vast majority of prisoners of war in the above-mentioned prisoner of war camps, that is, there needs to be “materials” that can convict these prisoners of war of capital crimes.

prisoner of war camp briefing and “burden reduction” suggestions

actually,He called for “lightening the burden” on the old belsk and kozelisk prison camps. After belia took over as the people’s Committee of internal affairs on November 25, 1938, it was a “new line” he pursued to “reduce the burden” on the prisons and various concentration camps under his jurisdiction. In 1939, under the guidance of this line, the number of prisoners in prisons under the Ministry of the people’s Committee of the interior decreased by nearly 13. On January 1, 1939, a total of 352507 prisoners were held in the prisons of the Ministry of the people’s Committee of the interior. On April 1, it decreased to 281891, 196854 before July 1 and 178258 before October 1. Therefore, soplunenko’s proposal to “reduce the burden” for the prison camp is fully in line with belia’s policy. In the report, Thorpe Lu Enke suggested the following measures: “heavy patients, completely disabled persons, TB patients, 60 and 60 years old or older people (about 300). Release them all and go home. Release the agronomists, doctors, engineers, technicians and teachers who have no bad materials among the reserve officers in Ukraine and Belarus. According to preliminary materials, it is estimated that 400-500 such persons may be released. ” For another category of personnel, namely Border Guard officers, judicial personnel, landlords, “Polish military organization” and “shooter”, the “Polish military organization” was a secret group established by Jo bisusky in 1914. At first, it mainly carried out reconnaissance and sabotage activities against Czarist Russia; Later, it was incorporated into the Polish army. “Shooter” or “shooter alliance”, founded in 1919, is a military patriotic group targeting Polish youth. Under the leadership of the Polish Ministry of defense, it supports the bisusky faction politically. Activists of the party, officers of the second division of the former Polish general staff and espionage officers (about 400), he proposed to handle their case files and “submit them to the special meeting of the people’s Committee of the interior for examination”. The head of the pow administration also suggested that “the investigation of such personnel should preferably be carried out by the Ministry of the people’s interior of Belarus and Ukraine; if not, all the above-mentioned persons should be concentrated in ostashkov camp for investigation.”

in fact, this is another classification scheme, but it is not a scheme involving all prisoners of war in the two camps. The 700-800 people recommended to be released, plus those who need further review, but 1100-1200 people are only a small part of the personnel of the two camps. Soplunenko did not mention how to deal with most of the other prisoners of war, mainly military officers. Perhaps, in soprinenko’s consciousness, officers and the above-mentioned personnel should also be treated differently. The former is not included in the “burden reduction” except for the old, weak and seriously ill.

soprinenko’s proposal was valued by belia. He summoned Deputy people’s Committee of the interior melkulov for consultation on the matter. In soprinenko’s report, belia’s instructions were left: “Comrade melkulov, please come to our office to talk.” No written record was found on the specific content of this conversation, but it is likely that the two leaders of the Ministry of the people’s Committee of the interior exchanged views and made decisions on some major issues of “burden reduction”. Just two days later, on February 22, melkulov instructed the pow administration, the Ministry of the Ukrainian people’s interior Commission, and the Voroshilov State Bureau, Smolensk State Bureau and Kalinin State Bureau of the Ministry of the people’s interior Commission, Conveyed belia’s instructions: “All former prison officials, spies, spies, settlers, judicial personnel, landlords, businessmen and large private individuals detained in the old biersk, kozelisk and ostashkov camps of the Ministry of the people’s interior were transferred to prison and handed over to the institutions of the Ministry of the people’s interior. All materials related to them were handed over to the investigation department of the State Bureau of the Ministry of the people’s interior for investigation Check. How these files will be handled in the future will be instructed separately. ”

on the next day, the pow Administration issued corresponding instructions to each POW camp, requiring to find out the exact number of the above personnel within five days, report the transfer location of the personnel, and continue to find the same personnel in the camp. The instructions of the prisoners of war administration especially emphasize that “all the work of transferring prisoners of war to prison should be strictly confidential, which should be paid attention to.”

it should be noted that there are no officers or prisoners of war involved here.

sending the above designated personnel to prison is certainly “reducing the burden” for the prison camp, but for the Ministry of the people’s Committee of the interior, it is just transferring them from one place of detention to another place of detention, which does not really “reduce the burden”. In the sense of real “burden reduction”, the first half of soprinenko’s proposal on February 20 seemed more practical, but belia did not adopt it. Instead, she sent all the personnel recommended by the pow administration to prison. Past practice has shown that prisons can also “reduce the burden”, and the way out of “reducing the burden” here is nothing more than three ways: release, sending to labor camp and execution. Unable to understand belia’s real thoughts at that time, we can only infer belia’s intention to issue such an order from the only materials and common sense. If he feels that these people can finally be released, it would be superfluous to transfer them to prison and continue the investigation there; If it is intended to send these personnel to the labor camp, not to mention that it is not necessary to go through the prison in a circle (the Polish prisoners of war who are still working on the No. 1 construction site and the enterprises affiliated to the people’s Committee of ferrous metallurgy are the best examples), it is obviously inappropriate for those old, weak and seriously ill prisoners of war. In other words, the first official response of the leader of the Ministry of the people’s Committee of the interior to soplunenko’s proposal has revealed the intention to solve this part of the Polish prisoner of war problem in the most thorough way.

deal with the expansion of the scope of prisoners of war and the resolution of the Political Bureau

. In late February and early March, the central work of the prisoner of war Administration Bureau was to urge the three special prisoner of war camps to report classified statistics of prisoners and personal resume registration materials of prisoners of war. The registration of prisoners of war begins as soon as they enter the camp. Therefore, a registration section is specially set up in the institutional sequence of each prisoner of war camp. However, due to various reasons, there are many problems in the registration of each battalion, which can not accurately and in detail reflect the real situation of prisoners of war. After Beria’s order of December 31, 1939, the prisoners of war administration “in order to obtain the information of prisoners of war held in each battalionA supplementary resume was formulated and distributed to all battalions on January 5, 1940, requiring prisoners of war to fill in one by one. This form is divided into five columns. In addition to filling in the last position held by prisoners of war in the former Polish army and other institutions and the foreign language they master, it should also “fill in the place and time of prisoners of war in the Soviet Union in great detail, as well as what kind of work they did during their stay in the Soviet Union”; “Information about all relatives and acquaintances of prisoners of war living in the Soviet Union” and “information about prisoners of war abroad (outside the former Poland) must indicate the specific location, start and end date and work”. In the instruction to each battalion, it is emphasized that special attention should be paid to the filling in of the last three items.

in late February, the pow Administration ordered the POW camp to complete this work in the near future, “it should be noted that this work can not be delayed”.

political commissar nehrosev of the pow administration and the director of the second Office (Registration Office), Yi Bao maklyarski, called the kozelisk battalion on the same day on February 27 and asked to report the registration and investigation materials of the officers in custody of the battalion immediately. Maklyarski asked to send the registration materials of all officers, and then nehrosev asked to send messengers to send four or five completed registration files immediately. It can be seen that the latter is more eager to get these materials than the former, even a few copies.

shows from one side that the scope of prisoners of war to be handled by the prisoner management authorities has been further expanded. If in his report on February 20, sopronenko distinguished the officer prisoners of war from the police, prison officials and other prisoners of war, and his attention was mainly focused on the latter, now the former – the former officer of the Polish Army – has also been included in the “line of sight”. There are two facts to support it. At the end of March, the officers not only sorted out all the prisoners of war, but also sorted out a series of prisoners of war detention materials, including a series of prisoners of war in the first three months. Second, on March 2, the Politburo adopted the decision “on guarding the border between the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the western region of the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic”, It is suggested that the Ministry of the people’s Committee of internal affairs of the Soviet Union “from April 15 this year, all 22000 ~ 25000 families of former Polish army officers, police, prison officials, gendarmerie, intelligence personnel, former landlords, factory owners and former senior officials of Polish state organs who are suppressed and detained in prisoner concentration camps will be moved to various regions of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic for a period of 10 years”.

it can be seen that the Soviet authorities treated the prisoners themselves and their families equally.

the above materials show that the Soviet authorities had decided to deal with the prisoners of war in the three special prisoner of war camps together in late February 1940. Whether the special “materials” sorted out in the previous stage have played a role cannot be proved at present; However, with such “materials”, there is no doubt that the Soviet authorities have more reason to make the decision to give the most severe treatment to these prisoners of war.

on March 5, 1940, the resolution made by the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Bolshevik) on the basis of a letter from belia to Stalin directly led to the tragic fate of prisoners of war in three special prisoner of war camps and prisoners held in prisons in Ukraine and Western Belarus. Belia’s letter is almost identical to the Politburo’s resolution. One major change is that Stalin crossed out belia’s name from the three member group responsible for examining these cases and replaced it with BA ZA kobrov, deputy people’s member of the internal affairs committee and director of the general economic administration of the Ministry of internal affairs. In this way, in addition to the original first deputy member of the people’s Committee of the interior, Fu Ni melkulov, and the director of the first special department of the Ministry of the people’s Committee of the interior, Le fo bashtakov, there are no ministerial heads in the three member group. This change is intriguing., And it was completed on the same day, which shows that the supreme decision-making group of the Soviet Union has no differences on this issue. Belia’s son, Sergei belia, pleaded in his memory of his father published in 1994 that belia was the only Kremlin leader who opposed the execution of Polish officers. Because he believed that “war is inevitable. Officers of the Polish army are potential allies in the Anti War struggle.” She belia supports her view by presenting the fact that “no matter in the materials of the Politburo meeting held on March 5, 1940 or in other documents, there is no signature of my father.” See Xie belia, my father belia, compiled by Chengdu Science and Technology Translation Research Association, people’s publishing house, 2001, page 403. If what Shea Beria said is true, Stalin can explain by crossing out Beria’s name. However, the existing materials do not give stronger support to Xie belia’s point of view. So the problem doesn’t seem so simple. Stalin was the first to sign belia’s letter and write “agree”, which will also have a decisive impact on the smooth passage of this resolution. In addition, the original is also signed by Molotov, migyang and Voroshilov; In addition, Kalinin and Kaganovich agreed. This resolution of the Political Bureau of

,

,

and

recommended to the Ministry of the people’s Committee for internal affairs of the Soviet Union: “I. (1) cases against 14700 former Polish officers, officials, landlords, police, spies, gendarmeries, settlers and prison officials in the prison camp; (2) And the arrest and detention of 11000 members of various counter revolutionary espionage organizations and sabotage groups, former landlords, factory owners, former Polish officers, officials and cross-border elements in prisons in western Ukraine and Western Belarus – tried by special procedures and executed with capital punishment

when trying a case, it is not necessary to summon the defendant, nor bring a public lawsuit, nor produce the investigation conclusion and judgment, but adopt the following procedures: (1) the case of prisoners of war in the POW camp shall be tried according to the supporting materials issued by the pow Administration Bureau of the Ministry of internal affairs of the Soviet Union; (2) Prisoners in prisons in western Ukraine and Western Belarus will be tried according to the materials issued by the Ministry of internal affairs of Ukraine and Belarus.

III. by comrades melkulov and kobrovThe “transformation” of these prisoners of war is not in the general sense and lacks due patience. Lack of patience, in the final analysis, or lack of confidence. As mentioned earlier, in the contradiction between the Soviet authorities and prisoners of war, the former is in an indisputable dominant position. The resistance and even resistance of prisoners of war certainly increased the difficulty of achieving the results of “transformation”, but this is not the main reason for solving the contradiction by physical elimination. The leaders of the Soviet Union lost confidence in “reforming” these prisoners of war, and lost confidence that the established prisoner management system could peacefully solve the contradictions with prisoners of war, which was the main reason for the tragedy.

“burden reduction action” and “Katyn incident”

the existing materials have made the truth of the “Katyn incident” known to the world. In the 1990s, Soviet scholars published a series of articles and monographs around the “Katyn incident”, such as ЛебедеваН Hold ОтрагедииКатынскиеголоса;Катынь:преступлениепротнвчеловечества;ПарсадановаВ Hold Кистриикатыскогодела;АбариновВ Embrace атынскийлабиринт;ЗоряЮ Cuddle the bowl and support the piqiang, be tired and support the sudden атынскойтрагедииОпубликовановсборнике “ Берия:конецкарьеры”,М Bao Hai, Shua Hua, Xi Xi, Xue lie 1991, etc. In addition, two collections of documents were published to collect archival materials on the Katyn incident: ЯсноваО.В Embrace атынскаядрама:Козельск,Старобельск,Осташков:судьбаинтернированныхпольскихвоеннослужащих,Москва:Политиздат, 1991; ПихояР Hold, КозловВ Holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leop Катынь。 These historical archives directly from the Soviet Union played an important role in revealing the truth of the Katyn incident. Strictly speaking, the “Katyn incident” should include two meanings: one is the context of the incident itself, and the other is that in April 1943, Germany announced the discovery of the remains of killed Polish officers, which had an impact on the international community, especially on Soviet Polish relations.

before the adoption of the resolution of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Bolshevik) to shoot Polish prisoners of war and some detainees on March 5, 1940, the special session of the people’s Ministry of internal affairs of the Soviet Union had made a final judgment on Polish prisoners of war held in three special prisoner camps, and preparations for the implementation of this judgment were also carried out intensively. In early March, the special office of the Ministry of the interior, together with the prisoner of war administration, held a meeting in Moscow with the participation of the heads of the special sections of the prisoner of war camps, the commander of the escort force of the Ministry of the interior and the head of the “Gulag”. The main issues discussed in the two-day meeting were: “1. Close the pepper camp to prepare for the removal of the sentenced persons; 2. Banbanter on the judgment of the special meeting of the people’s Court of justice; 3. Banter on the judgment of the people’s Court of justice that the people’s Court of justice are more generous than the people’s court; 3. Whether the people’s court is in the prisoner of war camp or the railway station; 4. The equipment of the Rician bureau is dripping with the sole; 5. The roasted hair is not rare!

ПихояР Hold, КозловВ Holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leop Катынь,с 383. Koretov, chief of the special section of ostashkov prisoner of war camp, proposed that “considering that these people are the most active counter revolutionary force”, they should be arranged according to their place of origin, as in the previous treatment of Polish prisoners repatriated and sent to Germany, “so that the sentenced persons think they are repatriated”; “In order to avoid all kinds of accidents and obstruction, the judgment of the special session cannot be announced here, but at the place where they will be detained.”

ПихояР Hold, КозловВ Holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leopard, holding a leop Катынь,с 383. It can be seen that the relevant departments had considered some issues very carefully at that time. After the adoption of the Politburo resolution, preparations for the implementation of this resolution began to accelerate. In mid March, the Ministry of the interior held a series of meetings in Moscow, and all relevant departments carefully studied the specific process of implementing the Politburo’s resolution. At the same time, the three special POW camps and the Ukrainian and Belarusian internal affairs people’s committees have stepped up sorting out the materials of prisoners of war and prisoners held in prisons. These materials include personal materials of the persons who decided to execute the death penalty, investigation files and a simple form developed by one of the “three person committee” and the director of the General Administration of economic management of the Ministry of the interior, kobrov. The form consists of four columns, including name, time and place of arrest, original position, military rank and conclusion. The last one determines the final fate of the owner of the form. These materials are collected by each POW camp to the pow Administration Bureau. After passing the examination, they are transferred to the first special office of the Ministry of internal affairs. After the first office reviews, it fills in the “conclusion” column with preliminary handling opinions. Some materials are proposed to be sent to melkulov for personal review; The remaining materials and lists were sent to the “Committee of three”. Their decision is final.

prisoners of war sentenced to death are not executed in the prison camp. They will be sent to Kalinin, Smolensk and Kharkov state prisons, where they will be sentenced and executed immediately. Melkulov and the “Committee of three” issued a list of judgments in duplicate. One is the “list of sending personnel” to each prisoner of war camp and the other is the “list of receiving personnel” to the internal affairs bureaus of the above three states. In fact, this is the execution list. The transportation General Administration of the Ministry of the people’s Committee of the interior is responsible for transporting the executed persons from the prison camp to the place of execution. The bureau not only formulated a detailed transportation plan in advance, but also reported the situation to melkulov every day during the transportation. All the above preparations and actions are called “burden reduction action” in the correspondence between the Ministry of the interior.

according to the available materials, the execution began in the first few days of April 1940The bodies of Soviet citizens found in Tinglin are similar. After killing an officer, a bouncing bullet pierced into the dead body in the pit, confirming the hypothesis that the shooting was obviously carried out in a trench to avoid the trouble of transporting the body to the grave. The collective grave is located on the newly reclaimed land in the forest. The grave is completely leveled and planted with small pine trees. Collective graves are excavated in uneven places. The upper layer is mostly sand, while groundwater even appears in the lowest place. Without exception, the bodies were facing down, side by side, close to each other, layer by layer. The corpses around the tomb are obviously arranged neatly, while the corpses in the middle are chaotic. According to the consensus of the committee, the uniforms of the excavated bodies, especially the buttons, rank marks, decorations, the style of boots, etc., are undoubtedly polish. They wear winter clothes and often find fur coats, leather coats, knitted vests and typical Polish officer hats. Only a few bodies were figures from other classes, and one body was a priest. While testing clothes, we also tested accessories. No watch or ring was found on the body, although judging from the exact date and time recorded in several diaries, the owner kept these ornaments until the last days or even hours. The documents found on the body – diaries, letters, newspapers – ranged from the autumn of 1939 to March and April 1940. So far, the latest time that can be determined is the date of April 22, 1940 in a Soviet newspaper. Because the bodies are in different positions in the grave and side by side, they decay to different degrees. According to Professor olsos, Professor of forensic and Criminology at the University of Budapest. According to our experience, examining the changes in the skull of a cadaver is very important to determine the time of death. These changes include different layers of the calcareous shell on the surface of the decayed skull. Such changes are not observed on bodies buried for less than three years. However, this change was clearly observed in the skull of body 526. The body was found on the surface of a large tomb.

the second material is the report written by Owen omare, British ambassador to the Polish government in exile, to Ann Eden, British Foreign Secretary after talking with some poles from the Soviet Union. Omare listed some polish views on the Katyn incident – of course, these views were unfavorable to the Soviet Union. Then he wrote:

Smolensk is 20 kilometers away from the place where the tomb was found. It has two railway stations. In and around the city, two main railway lines from Moscow to Warsaw and from Riga to oriol cross here. About 15 kilometers to the west of Smolensk is the humble gnezdovo station, which is only a few kilometers away from gnezdovo. It is the so-called “sheep mountain” called by the local people. The Katyn area where the hill is located is covered with abandoned virgin forest. The forest is dominated by coniferous trees, but between pine trees are also dotted with hardwoods and shrubs. The place enters spring in April and the trees turn green in early May. But the winter from 1939 to 1940 was the coldest in history. When the first people from kozelisk arrived on April 8, some places were still covered with thick snow. Of course, the rugged road from the station to Yangshan is muddy. In gnezdovo, trains from kozelisk, old belsk and ostashkov unloaded their passengers in a prison surrounded by barbed wire, surrounded by Soviet soldiers. The preparations made here to accept them must have disturbed most Polish officers. Some must be frustrated because they can still remember that the Katyn Forest was used by the Bolsheviks as a convenient place to massacre many Russian officers in 1919. A Polish living in London named James laskovsky told me that when he was 11 years old, he listened to an executioner named afanasiyev every night about his work during the day. The man lives in his mother’s house. He said that the prisoners were taken from the prison to the truck and came to Yangshan along the mountain village road, and their hands must be tied when they got off the truck. Depression turned into despair. It seems that if a man struggles, the executioner will lift his clothes, cover his head, tie it around his neck, and take him to the edge of the mass grave. In many cases, the bodies were found with their heads covered, and their clothes were pierced by bullets in the skull. Those who died peacefully must have seen this terrible scene. Their comrades lay in a wide deep ditch. Around the pit, they were lined up like the sardine in the tin, and their heads were arranged neatly to their feet. The middle of the grave was rather chaotic. The executioners trampled on the bodies like butchers in livestock pens, trampling in a pool of blood and dragging the dead bodies. When all this was done and the last bullet pierced the head of the last living polish, the butchers – perhaps trained as children – used their hands for the most innocent work: leveling clods and planting conifers on the slaughterhouse. Of course, it’s quite late to transplant small trees in this season, but it’s not too late, because three years later, when Polish representatives visited this place, the leaves just began to dry up.

climate and conifers have their own importance. The climate of Smolensk illustrates the fact that although the Germans had heard of the existence of collective graves in the autumn of 1942, it was only in April 1943 that they announced to the world what they had dug up. The explanation should be this: it was not German propagandists who chose a political opportunity to announce their discovery, but Smolensk’s winter froze the soil so hard that it was impossible to excavate without explosives or other similar powerful tools that could destroy the body and make it illegible. The winter of 1942-1943 was extraordinarily warm, and the German government might start working as soon as the soil became soft enough. Those little pines also deserve special attention. First, they are proof that the Soviets are presumed guilty. Considering that the German army occupied Smolensk in an unexpected victory in July 1941, if the Polish officers were killed by the Germans rather than the Soviets, the Germans could not bother to cover the victims’ graves with small trees. secondly,A competent botanist just needs to examine a small tree to find out whether it was planted in May 1940 or sometime after July 1941. Perhaps this test of Soviet honesty should begin immediately. Both materials are from Paul Preston and Michael partridge, British documents on Foreign Affairs: reports and papers the foreign office confidentialprintpart III, from1940through1945european volume 5central European April 1943-march 1944, Cambridge: University of United States of America, 1998, PP 109-110, 105-106.

by comparing the two materials with the materials in the previous Soviet archives, we will find that they describe a basic outline of the “Katyn incident”. Although some of the specific details are not exactly the same, the clue is now clearer, from the execution of the order of the people’s Committee of the interior to the execution of Polish prisoners of war and prisoners to the discovery of the bodies of the victims by the Germans. In the spring of 1943, these facts were not and could not be revealed to the world as they are now. People can only speculate and infer about this, but the impact of this emergency immediately appeared.

to interrupt diplomatic relations with the Polish government in exile

the news broadcast by radio Berlin on the discovery of Katyn Forest on April 13, 1943 was both unexpected and somewhat expected for the Polish government in exile. Although they have not had time to verify the true identity of the victims, the fact that the government in exile has repeatedly asked the Soviet government to find out the whereabouts of some famous military officers and has not received a reply, as well as the abnormal phenomenon that these people are still silent after the Soviet Union announced the release of almost all prisoners of war, is enough to make it make the worst guess about the fate of these military officers. Therefore, the news released by the Germans feels intuitively credible to the poles in London. In addition, due to the friction between Anders’ army and Soviet Polish embassy representatives, Soviet Polish relations have become increasingly tense, and there is not enough buffer space between them to accommodate this emergency. On 17 April, the government in exile issued a statement stating that it was ready to seek help from the International Red Cross to find out the truth. At the same time, defense minister kukier also issued a report on the unsuccessful efforts of the Polish side to find the whereabouts of a number of officers. The written document of the government in exile requesting the International Red Cross to investigate the matter was sent to the headquarters of the International Red Cross in Lausanne, Switzerland, almost at the same time as a document with basically the same content in Germany. This may be a coincidence, but objectively, it makes the Polish government in exile passive. Under the fierce attack of the Soviet government, the government in exile had to announce on April 30 that they believed that the request to the International Red Cross had expired. See a. Toynbee and V. Toynbee, a survey of international affairs (1939-1946): European restructuring, translated by Lao Jingsu, Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 1995, pp. 224-233.

on the contrary, the Soviet government changed from passive to active in this matter. It should be said that the Katyn incident was a complete accident to the Soviet government. When dealing with these poles in the spring of 1940, no one would have expected such an outcome. On April 16, the Soviet government issued an announcement after two days of silence to counterattack the German propaganda. “The German Fascist villains have not stopped spreading the most absurd and despicable lies in their new absurd assumptions. It is now clear that they are trying to use these lies to cover up their own heinous crimes,” the announcement said

the reasons for the Soviet Union’s counterattack were: first, in the summer of 1941, after the red army withdrew from Smolensk, Polish prisoners of war engaged in construction fell into the hands of the German army together with a large number of Soviet citizens; Second, the German said that the village of gnezdovo, where a large number of remains were found, is the famous archaeological excavation site of “gnezdovo tomb” in history, which German propaganda avoided.

objectively speaking, the above reasons put forward by the Soviet Union are not very convincing. It is entirely possible that the Polish prisoners of war captured by Germany and the Polish prisoners of war executed by the Soviet Union were different. After the Red Army liberated Smolensk, a special committee to investigate the “Katyn incident” immediately began to investigate according to the instructions of the special committee to investigate the crimes of the German occupiers. From 5 October 1943 to 10 January 1944, the Commission interviewed 95 witnesses and examined 17 testimonies. Many of the witnesses confirmed that they had seen Polish prisoners of war engaged in construction in the spring and summer of 1941, before the area was occupied by the German army. It cannot be said that the testimonies of these witnesses were forged, because they were also cited in a top secret document drafted by Lieutenant Colonel a bi ban d, one of the heads of the special committee. see Военно According to the law of the people’s Republic of China, the law of the people’s Republic of China, 1990, № 11, с 27-34。, Therefore, in the absence of sufficient and reliable evidence to prove that they are the same group, there is not necessarily an antagonistic relationship between the victims said by the Germans and the captured said by the Soviet Union. Secondly, there is a good evidence that when the Polish army was formed in the Soviet Union, Poland asked the whereabouts of a group of Polish officers several times. At that time, the Soviet authorities, including Stalin, replied that the Soviet Union had released these people and never mentioned that they were captured by the Germans. One would ask, if so, why didn’t the Soviet authorities tell the Polish government this at that time? As for the reasons for archaeological excavation, it is not difficult for forensic and biologists to prove which are ancient remains and which have just been buried for two years. This loophole was caught by Goebbels and his propaganda machine. At a meeting chaired by Goebbels on April 17, the Nazi propaganda minister said, “one of the big mistakes made by the Bolsheviks yesterday was that they fabricated ‘archaeological relics’. There, the International Commission will conduct research and expose this shameless lie. The second mistake is that the Polish officers who were captured by Germany are nowThose officers whose whereabouts were inquired by the poles many times and even by Stalin himself. ” Goebbels therefore suggested that “now we should wait for the International Committee. Naturally, we should not talk casually, but provide convincing evidence.”

the obvious loopholes that the Soviet Union appeared in the announcement were not conducive to itself, which once again showed that the incident really came suddenly and caught the Soviet Union unprepared.

but the Soviet Union quickly took advantage of its advantageous position gained in the anti fascist war and greatly consolidated by the victory of Stalingrad, which had just ended, and linked anything unfavorable to itself with Hitler’s malicious slander, which occurred after the German army’s disastrous defeat in Stalingrad, More reasonable. Although the government in exile deliberately drew a clear line between itself and Goebbels in its initial statement, the Soviet Union still accused it of complicity with Hitler.

when the truth of the problem cannot be known for a moment, people are often used to judging from the existing and recognized facts. On this point, the pile crimes committed by the Nazi regime in the past are more convincing than anything. In addition, Goebbels’ propaganda machine made a big fuss on this matter, which also helped the Soviet Union. On April 6, a week before Germany officially announced the discovery of Katyn Forest, Goebbels’ confidants decided to “immediately use the evidence for publicity purposes” and hoped to find people from the Polish Red Cross Society controlled by Germany.

on April 14, Goebbels instructed: “The focus of our propaganda in recent days will be more focused on two topics: the Atlantic barrier and the despicable massacre of the Bolsheviks. It is necessary to prove this brutality of the Soviet Union to the world by constantly providing new facts. In the comments, as often done, it should be noted that this is the Bolsheviks trusted by the British and Americans. They seem to have changed and changed their politics Rule faith. This is the Bolsheviks who have gained absolute power from the British to rule and infiltrate Bolsheviks into Europe. ”

Goebbels’ purpose is very clear. He not only wants to attack the Bolsheviks with the Katyn incident, but also “create a huge division in the enemy front”.

this is enough to arouse the vigilance of the anti fascist allies. This vigilance is related to the outcome of the war, in other words, to the overall interests of the allies and the greatest politics at that time. It is not difficult to judge which is more important on specific issues such as the Katyn incident, especially when the truth cannot be clarified under the conditions of the war. Although these judgments do not seem accurate now, they could only be so at that time. With these factors,

,

,

and

, the Soviet Union not only changed from passive to active, but also made the first counter attack: on April 25, Moscow sent a note to the new Polish ambassador to the Soviet Union Romer, announcing that the Soviet government had suspended diplomatic relations with the Polish government. In addition to pointing out that the series of actions of the Polish government can not help but make people suspect that it has “contact and collusion with the German government in the campaign of hostility to the Soviet Union”, the note also linked the matter to the Soviet Polish border issue, It is believed that the Polish government in exile is to “exert pressure on the Soviet government to force it to make territorial concessions that harm the interests of Soviet Ukraine, Soviet Belarus and Soviet Lithuania.”

this shows that the Soviet Union has seen that it is impossible to solve the border problem with the government in exile after it cannot carry out military cooperation with it.

during the 33 months when the Soviet Union maintained diplomatic relations with the Polish government in exile, including military cooperation, the Soviet Union tried to solve the “Polish problem”, including determining the Soviet Polish border, solving the future Polish territorial problem, and establishing the Soviet Polish military alliance to fight against Germany. But in the end, none of the above problems could be completely solved. It can be said that the Soviet attempt failed. One of the reasons is that the general environment is not very favorable. This period was the most difficult period of the Soviet Union in the whole war. The dangerous situation of the Soviet Union made it impossible for it to put the issue of post-war political arrangements in the first place. The unfavorable military situation also makes it not in a strong position in the negotiations, at least on the Soviet Polish border issue. Some ideas put forward by the Soviet Union, such as “moving Poland westward” after the war, were also discounted in reality because of the vigorous trend of German Fascism. Second, since the “Poland issue” is an international issue from the beginning, the position of the international community, first of all the anti fascist allied powers, on this issue is of great importance. At the beginning of the war, the Soviet Union needed the support of Britain and the United States very much – from providing weapons and equipment to opening up a second battlefield, which increased the weight of Britain and the United States in solving the “Polish problem”. Both Britain and the United States did not support the Soviet Union’s position on the Soviet Polish border issue or the withdrawal of Anders’ troops. On the contrary, they exerted pressure on the Soviet Union with the help of some issues. The British approach to the withdrawal of troops from Anders is as described above. In mid November 1941, he also sent a message to Stalin from the special envoy of the president for loan affairs, AI Harriman, saying that the United States was interested in turning the Polish army to the command of Western powers. It is difficult to solve the “Polish problem” without the recognition and cooperation of the main allies, let alone their constraints and opposition. Third, the Polish government in exile has a firm and tenacious position on both the border issue and the military issue in the Soviet Union. Although there are factors behind the support of Western powers, it should also be noted that from its position, both issues are major issues related to national interests. First, as a government composed of four parties, it is not easy to reach an agreement; Second, making concessions on such issues will entail huge political risks and even ruin the political future of the whole government. At the same time, the influence of Russia on Poland in history and the series of practices of the Soviet Union after the outbreak of the second world war do hurt Poland’s national feelings, which will also play a certain role in the decision-making of the government in exile.

although the Soviet Union’s efforts to solve the “Polish problem” did not achieve beneficial results, this experience was not completely meaningless to it. At least it realized how important it was to have a government friendly to the Soviet Union to solve the “Polish problem” according to the wishes of the Soviet Union. After a period of “testing” , the leaders of the Soviet Union believed that although the Polish government in exile could restore diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, conclude military cooperation agreements, or jointly sign the declaration of friendship and mutual assistance, it was still the regime of the Polish landlord and bourgeoisie and safeguarded the interests of the ruling class safeguarded by the Polish regime before the war, Naturally, it is difficult to fundamentally change the policy towards the Soviet Union. Although the slogan of “two enemies” is no longer publicly publicized, it has not been completely abandoned. Those who had actively pursued the anti Soviet policy still occupied high positions in the government in exile and played an important role in the activities of the government in exile. In this way, for the Soviet Union, several basic elements for solving the “Polish problem” have gradually become clear: the armed forces of the Soviet Union and Poland should jointly fight against Germany and win the war, which is the basic premise for solving the “Polish problem” and the cornerstone of the Soviet Polish alliance with Germany during and after the war; The determination of Poland’s border in the future must first ensure the security interests of the Soviet Union. At the same time, Poland’s territory can be expanded westward by taking part of its territory from Germany, which is the best solution to the problem of Poland’s border territory; Poland must have a friendly government to the Soviet Union, which is not only the key to solving the “Polish problem”, but also the necessary condition for establishing a democratic and independent new Poland in the concept of the Soviet Union; In addition, in the process of solving the “Poland problem”, it is also necessary to strive for the cooperation of anti fascist countries. This is because the “Poland problem” itself is closely related to the war and the post-war political arrangements. It is not only an internal issue of Poland, but also an international issue.

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