I.

self help and alliance theory in the face of a powerful opponent, if a country wants to maintain its own security, the most natural way is to increase the strength it can use as much as possible to check and balance the former.

Among them, the most basic way is, of course, to enhance national strength, especially military strength.

This is called self-help.

“Self help” efforts will enhance a country’s ability to resist its opponents, thus reducing the possibility of the latter starting a war.

However, countries in the world are different in size and strength.

Countries in a defensive position are usually weaker than their opponents, and most of them are born with this.

Therefore, if a country planning to launch an attack and a defensive country as its opposite achieve policy objectives by strengthening its military strength, the latter can be more incompetent on the whole.

In reality, many countries have little economic and technological foundation to rely on to improve their military strength.

Accordingly, it can be seen that the most active advocates of self-restraint in disarmament and armaments are mostly small and medium-sized countries or countries inclined to maintain the status quo.

“Self help” also affects inter state relations in other ways.

For example, since “self-help” is the main way for a country to achieve its security goals, the military industrial department or military industrial complex will have the above negative effects, and the military will have room to expand organizational interests.

In addition, in the context of anarchy in the international system, a country’s “self-help” behavior may also give birth to a “security dilemma”.

In the face of a security opponent, in addition to “self-help” to enhance its own strength, a country can also seek allies.

There is a self-evident relationship between war and peace between allies and countries.

On the eve and in the middle of many international wars, alliance activities and alliance relations are common.

If a country with offensive intentions gains allies, it usually strengthens its determination to achieve its goals.

For example, the establishment of the British Japanese Alliance undoubtedly accelerated the pace of Japan’s war against Russia (however, some studies believe that there is no direct connection between the alliance and the occurrence of the war).

On the contrary, if countries adopting defensive strategies find partners to join hands, they may increase the containment of their opponents.

The difference is that although weaker and smaller defensive countries are often unable to compete with stronger rivals mainly by strengthening their own strength, they obviously have more room to seek external support.

Therefore, alliance is a security means that weak countries are willing to try.

Moreover, since one or some countries that intend to change the current situation of interest distribution will usually arouse the concerns and even fears of a larger number of countries that hope to maintain a stable pattern, defensive countries are often easier to find like-minded people.

“Balance of power” is a natural strategy for these countries to balance ambitious opponents, and alliance is a natural part of this strategy.

However, a defensive alliance cannot be formed easily.

A typical example is the performance of Britain, France and the Soviet Union on whether to cooperate against Germany in the 1930s.

Even if the common primary threat has actually come, it may be difficult for the countries concerned to detect the approaching threat, or they may have different views on who is the main source of the threat, or prevaricate with each other on the sharing of responsibilities, or even attempt to sacrifice other countries to watch time change or seek the interests of fishermen, so as to fail to unite in time.

There is also a situation in which one of the countries turns to the country that should be opposed for various reasons, that is, the so-called “band waging”.

Even if a defensive alliance can be established, the effective cooperation between its constituent countries will still be a problem.

For example, can they formulate clear military countermeasures against possible emergencies? To what extent is there a risk that one party may be abandoned by the other at a critical moment? In addition, similar to the “self-help” situation, the act of establishing an alliance may also lead to the “security dilemma” effect.

Even if two or more countries establish an alliance not because they have an evil intention towards a third party, the latter may regard it as a malicious act and take targeted measures, which may increase misunderstanding and tension between the countries concerned. 2. Hegemonic stability theory although the change of hegemony may lead to international war, a traditional theory of western international politics holds that the existence of hegemonic countries can ensure the stability of the international system, Because hegemonic countries can provide “public goods” such as a stable international peaceful environment and a stable and open international economic order.

In a world without hegemonic powers, countries can obtain these “public goods” through cooperation.

However, the “free rider” mentality of trying to enjoy these benefits without paying costs and the related difficulties of multi head cooperation make it difficult for countries to cooperate effectively.

Hegemonic countries can assume the main responsibility of providing international “public goods” and pay the main cost for it.

Because the benefits of these goods may exceed these costs, it is willing to pay the main cost for “public goods” that can be enjoyed by other countries free of charge.

Charles, American economist.

Goldberg was the founder of “hegemonic stability theory”.

At that time, he discussed the stability of the world economic system from this perspective.

Naturally, many limitations of the “hegemonic stability theory” have also been pointed out.

For example, some people believe that not all hegemonic countries are willing to provide an international order that benefits others.

The advance of hegemonic stability is that hegemonic countries must believe in the economic concept of liberalism, and major economic countries also need to agree with it.

It is also pointed out that the so-called “public goods” provided by hegemonic countries are not real public goods, and their beneficiaries are only a few.

Some critics also stressed that the theory of hegemonic stability advocated by American scholars is to prove the rationality of American domination of the world.

In addition, scholars who accept the theory of hegemonic stability to varying degrees basically agree that it is difficult for hegemonic countries to maintain their hegemonic status permanently (see below).

When it is in decline, it may implement selfish economic policies, resulting in turbulence and even conflict in the international system.

On the other hand, they have not denied that in a world without hegemony, major countries can cooperate and share the cost of providing “public goods”, although some people think such cooperation is very difficult.

Some scholars also have a relatively stable understanding of the international system in the “post hegemonic” eraEconomic exchanges within borders.

Therefore, it is unclear whether international economic activities are more important today than a century ago than domestic economic activities. 4. “Democratic Peace Theory” in the view of many western people, it is impossible for Western democratic countries to launch an imperialist foreign war, which is determined by their democratic system.

In the west, a popular view is that the nature of a country’s political system always negatively or positively affects the country’s war tendency, and the democratic system is more conducive to international peace.

Democracies tend to be more peaceful.

They will not fight with each other, or at least, the relationship between democracies is more peaceful than that between democracies and non democracies, and between non democracies and non democracies.

A world of democracies will be a world of peace.

Naturally, the “democracy” here is western.

“Democracy and peace theory” emphasizes the various constraints of democratic ideological norms and systems on foreign violence in democratic countries.

For example, the democratic system weakens social stratification and enables the requirements of different classes to be expressed more freely.

Under the influence of democratic political ideas, people prefer to settle disputes peacefully through negotiation and compromise.

The ideology of democracy is incompatible with the attempt to conquer and rule other countries.

Between democratic countries, no country can use helping other people gain freedom as an excuse for war.

The leaders of democratic countries are more likely to form ideological and emotional identity with each other.

The freedom of expression in democratic countries, as well as institutional factors such as election, transparency, decentralization, civilian governance and tenure system, make it difficult for leaders or some forces to launch wars at will. wait. Although the “Democratic Peace Theory” has been widely accepted in the western world, it has been questioned even by some western scholars.

For example, empirical studies have shown that democracies are not more peaceful.

However, some scholars pointed out that such studies did not properly control some variables, such as the power of the state.

Democratic countries are mainly industrialized countries, while industrialized countries are likely to be powerful countries, which are naturally easy to get involved in more wars.

Therefore, the empirical conclusion that democracies do not have more peaceful tendencies does not mean that democracy itself is not conducive to peace.

Another theory holds that the transition from non democratic system to democratic system may induce foreign conflict.

For countries in this transition process, on the one hand, the gradual opening of politics will promote public political participation and trigger more competing interests.

On the other hand, the temporary lack of a definite or mature political system that enables these requirements to be expressed and reconciled may intensify social contradictions and lead to sharp social conflicts.

In this case, those in power or elite groups whose domestic status is wavering may obtain domestic support or transfer domestic contradictions by advocating and implementing aggressive or aggressive foreign policies.

Obviously, this view belongs to the category of the above “transfer theory”.

Stanislav andrewski also found that countries with military dictatorship almost never engage in foreign wars, because the military’s control of the regime allows them to more effectively realize their will in domestic politics. V. on nuclear peace, the nature of weapons and war between states are clearly related to peace.

In this regard, no weapon has received so much attention as nuclear weapons.

A popular view is that if the opposing countries have nuclear weapons, the frequency and intensity of military conflicts between them will be greatly restrained, because once the conflict develops into nuclear war, either side will suffer unbearable and terrible losses.

Related to this, more people believe that the cold war between the United States and the Soviet Union has not developed into a hot war, which has played an extremely important role in checking the confrontation situation.

However, many scholars doubt the above-mentioned role of nuclear weapons in the “cold peace” between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Moreover, after the cold war, as more materials about the history of the cold war were disclosed and used, this voice tended to increase.

John Muller believes that it is not the emergence of nuclear weapons that makes people feel the terror of war.

The unprecedented casualties and huge losses caused by conventional wars such as the two world wars are enough to make people deeply reject war. K. J. halsti believes that “although no major country has launched an attack on another major country, we can only guess the reason: we cannot prove with certainty that constraints are the result of a successful strategic deterrence policy.

In fact, at any time in the foreseeable future.

There can be no evidence to prove this.

” Eric.

Herring also believes that during the cold war, the superpowers issued 21 nuclear threats, but there is little evidence of their role.

Richard Bates pointed out that in the first two decades when the United States had nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union, the U.S. President tended to issue vague nuclear threats, but did not consider the issue of credibility.

McGeorge, one of the main members of the US foreign policy-making team in the 1960s and who personally experienced a lot of crisis diplomacy between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Bondi also believes that the role of nuclear diplomacy is only a “false impression”.

Based on the case study of the Soviet Union’s role in the nuclear crisis in the Middle East in 1962, a large number of books have been published on the basis of the fourth case of the Soviet Union’s loss of the cold war in 1973.

Its authors Richard Leber and Janice Stein believe that the nuclear threat of the United States has no credibility in both crises.

The reason why the United States and the Soviet Union finally reached a compromise is not so much because they were afraid of nuclear war as because they were unwilling to fight a conventional war at all.

Both sides want to keep the tension out of control and not even worsen it.

Even if nuclear weapons do not exist.

Nevertheless, the theory of nuclear peace remains strong.

Kenneth.

Waltz is the main representative of this view.

He believed that the huge destructive power of nuclear strike would make a country cautious in dealing with opponents with nuclear weapons.

Moreover, pursuing a nuclear deterrence strategy does not require a nuclear arms race, because perhaps a few nuclear bombs can effectively curb the opponent.

This strategy will also reduce dependence on conventional weapons, thereby curbing the conventional arms race and enabling an implementation of nuclear weaponsA country with a deterrence strategy does not need the vast territory needed by a country that relies on conventional defense, which removes a major source of war.

In addition, the multipolar state is not as stable as the bipolar state, and the more widespread existence of nuclear weapons in the multipolar world can make up for this shortcoming.

The main doubts about the view of “nuclear peace” are: first, a country may carry out preventive strikes against its opponents’ efforts to develop nuclear weapons in order to prevent it from becoming a nuclear state.

In this way, nuclear deterrence is difficult to appear, while hostility and conflict between countries have intensified.

Second, even if nuclear deterrence among nuclear states can reduce the occurrence and escalation of conflicts, in order to make this nuclear deterrence have strategic stability, each party should have nuclear forces that can survive the first attack of its opponent and then carry out effective retaliation.

Otherwise, one or all parties will be tempted to attack the other’s nuclear forces first.

However, whether a nuclear country can have such a nuclear power is not a problem.

Third, the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence also requires that the possibility of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons be fully reduced.

However, in practice, this is not an easy move.

Fourth, the different values of leaders of all countries and their attempt to limit nuclear conflict may lead to the escalation of the conflict, or even cross the “nuclear gate”.

Fifth, the nuclear deterrence strategy cannot effectively curb the conventional arms and nuclear arms race.

Sixth, the increase of nuclear weapons may increase the risk that terrorist organizations acquire nuclear weapons and use them for terrorist activities.

Waltz has basically responded to these questions successively, which is mainly reflected in the confrontation between him and Scott Sagan, who questioned his views from the perspective of organizational behavior.

However, Sagan’s views on the viability of nuclear forces, preventive strike and strike, accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, etc.

seem more convincing.

After all, they are based on a lot of empirical analysis. Vi. cooperative security theory International Politics presents a picture of countries competing and conflicting with each other in a state of anarchy.

Accordingly, a long-standing idea is that we should strive to promote the order of international politics, establish institutional arrangements among countries that can effectively maintain peace and prevent aggression, and even eventually make the country no longer exist, so that all mankind can live in a unified community in harmony.

Related to this, Yu Guo.

Grotius expounded the role of international law, while Woodrow Wilson advocated the establishment of an international organization to maintain international peace and security.

International organizations that maintain international peace and security are based on certain principles of international law and are responsible for formulating and implementing relevant international rules.

The implementation of “collective security” is a central task of international organizations of this nature, at least literally.

The so-called collective security is such a non exclusive international arrangement: among the countries covered by this arrangement, if a country or group of countries invades another country, all other countries will jointly oppose or sanction the aggressor individually or jointly, so as to restrain the act of aggression.

The earlier League of nations and later the United Nations were collective security organizations in this sense.

However, as reflected in the virtual existence of the League of nations and the inability of the United Nations from time to time, collective security cannot be stably implemented.

The consensus is that the effectiveness of collective security depends at least on the following two conditions: first, most countries or major powers can reach a consensus on which acts constitute “aggression”.

second, they can seriously fulfill their obligations to combat the aggressor when the aggression occurs.

However, in reality.

These two points are difficult to be effectively guaranteed.

Whether in advance or at the time of aggression, due to the complexity of the motives or causes of acts of force among States, there are differences in views and interests among countries, especially among powerful countries, which makes it difficult for them to reach a clear and specific consensus on whether a certain act constitutes aggression.

Naturally, these factors will also negatively affect whether countries can take concerted and resolute action when aggression occurs.

Moreover, empirically, countries that launch aggression are often powerful countries, and collective security actions against such countries are more difficult than against a small country, especially when the aggression is launched by a group of two or more powerful countries.

In addition, there is more or less this danger: several powerful countries have turned the collective security organization into an institution serving a few countries under the banner of “collective security” by working together and controlling small and medium-sized countries.

Collective security focuses only on Curbing Acts of aggression between countries.

It does not consider how to deal with the efforts of countries to strengthen their own strength through self-help and alliance.

These efforts may be for defense or to accumulate strength for expansion.

They may exacerbate the sense of insecurity among countries, because the practice of strengthening the military power at one’s disposal will reduce the sense of security of other countries, and then urge them to take countermeasures that will in turn make the former feel insecure.

The “security dilemma” mentioned above is in this sense.

In this situation, security is a private value for all countries, and the security relationship between countries is zero sum.

The strengthening of one country’s security means the reduction of other countries’ security.

Accordingly, no country will gain a stable sense of security.

Thus, the concept of “common security” appeared.

It emphasizes that countries are interdependent in terms of security, and the insecurity of one country will lead to the insecurity of other countries.

If a country wants to secure itself and its allies, it must also ensure the security of its opponents and other countries.

Competition in armaments and military alliances can only make the countries concerned unstable.

All countries should exercise restraint in these areas in order to achieve a “common security” state in which their security can be strengthened, and pay more attention to and cooperate in solving non military security threats.

However, the traditional concept of “national security” is still far from the traditional concept of “national security”.

Specifically, the inclusion of “security threats” in the non military field into security issues reflects the concept of “comprehensive security”.

According to this concept, economic depression, environmental degradation, organized crime, drug trade, maritime robbery and so onIt should be raised to the level of safety issues.

This is not only because these problems can lead to or strengthen the insecurity of relevant human groups, a generalized insecurity that goes beyond the scope of violence, but also because they – especially economic and environmental problems – are often the direct or indirect cause of violent conflict.

Obviously, “comprehensive security” is a much broader concept than security in the traditional military sense.

However, it has also been questioned by many, especially among realists.

These criticisms mainly include: ① realism theory also pays attention to the role of economic and environmental factors in international conflicts.

② It is difficult to determine what constitutes economic security and environmental security.

③ Even if the previous problem can be solved, it is also a problem to identify what is a threat to the economy and the environment.

④ “Securitizing” economic and environmental issues may mean militarizing them, which will hinder their resolution.

⑤ Economic, environmental and military security problems are two fundamentally different types of problems.

The “security” of the former is of little value to solve both types of problems.

The narrow concept of “cooperative security” is to promote the realization of common security objectives through institutional arrangements.

here “Cooperative security is a strategic principle that seeks to achieve its goals through institutionalized coherence rather than material or operational coercion.

It presupposes the existence of mutually inclusive security goals and seeks to establish a cooperative rather than confrontational relationship between national military institutions.

The above cooperation is based on the acceptance and support of all countries, that is, the protection of national territory as the only goal Military objectives and subject the delivery of forces to the constraints of international consensus.

A sound cooperative arrangement embodying these principles will establish and implement appropriate standards for the scale, concentration, technical composition and actual operation of deployed military forces.

Mutual trust is its main goal.

” In a broad sense, “cooperative security” can be said to be a convergence of the three concepts of “collective security”, “common security” and “comprehensive security”.

The concept does not exclude collective security measures among States, but the focus is not to deter potential aggressors, but to establish a mutual trust atmosphere among States, so as to eliminate the root causes of inter state conflicts to a great extent.

Related to this, on the one hand, the idea of cooperative security advocates that all countries cooperate in the military field, so as to avoid the unstable security state caused by exclusive security competition and improve mutual trust and security.

On the other hand, cooperative security also advocates cooperation on security issues in the non military field, so as to eliminate the non military root causes of military security problems and provide a positive groundwork for cooperation in the military field.

Cooperation in the military field aimed at promoting common security remains the focus of cooperative security.

It includes dialogue on security issues, transparency measures or confidence building measures in armaments and military activities, arms control arrangements and preventive diplomacy.

However, it is doubtful whether cooperative security can become the main way for countries to pursue their own security.

The reason is not only that the three security concepts it covers have defects, but also that how to carry out stable cooperation in the field of security is also a difficult problem.

The difficulty lies not only in how to effectively overcome the “deception” or “betrayal” behavior in cooperation, but also in that although cooperative security aims to promote common security, a certain cooperative behavior may make one party safer and the other more dangerous.

For example, if a stronger country and a weaker country open all military information to each other, whose position will be strengthened and whose position will be weakened? VII.

The theory of security community since ancient times, the realization of lasting human peace has also been pinned on the hope that the world will move towards unity or unity.

In the contemporary theoretical research of international relations, how countries can gradually integrate from their separate state into a unified community is also an important theme.

Integration theory focuses on this.

For the concept of “integration”, many scholars have put forward different and common definitions.

For example, Ernst Haas regards it as a process of “persuading political leaders in different national environments to turn their loyalty, expectations and political activities to a new center”, and “the institutions of this new center have or require to master the jurisdiction over pre-existing nation states”.

The theory of “security community” is an important part of the integration theory, which is based on the communication theory.

In his view, the unity of a political system can be the result of exchanges and recognition among internal members that do not rely on external threats, and the country is built on a close communication and communication network.

The contact between countries is relatively sparse due to the barrier of borders, while the expansion of cross-border exchanges makes countries move towards integration.

Depending on this, doich put forward the concept of “security community”.

The so-called “security community” is a political system in which no political unit regards other units as the source of military threat.

Accordingly, the war between them is unimaginable.

DOIC divided the security community into “merger” and “pluralism”.

The former refers to an organization with a unified government composed of originally independent political units, which is actually a new country.

In the latter community, political units still maintain legal independence, but they cooperate very closely with each other.

Taking Austria Hungary, Britain Ireland alliance, Germany and Pakistan as examples, doich believes that the establishment of a consolidated security community requires the following conditions: ① the consistency of the main values of the constituent units.

② A unique and attractive way of life.

③ The expectation of each unit for mutual common welfare and close economic ties.

④ At least the full growth of the political and administrative capacity of a driving unit.

⑤ Some participating units can drive the higher economic growth level of other units.

⑥ An unbreakable social communication link between different units and social strata.

⑦ The expansion of the political elite, at least in some units and within the emerging community.

⑧ At least in the geographical and social sense of communication between the corresponding political strata.

⑨ Diversification of mutual communication and communication channels.

⑩ Between units to be integratedCooperation.

More scholars, especially realists, put more emphasis on the benefits of international mechanisms to international cooperation as the suppression of “defect” or “cheating” in the process of cooperation.

In their view, most cooperation problems in reality are games in the sense of “prisoner’s dilemma”, “deer hunting” or “coward”.

In these games, the outcome of one party’s cooperation and the other party’s betrayal will make the former suffer serious losses and the latter obtain obvious benefits.

In this way, in the context of international anarchy and therefore the betrayal is difficult to be adequately punished, the fear of the above situation will hinder the stable cooperation of the countries concerned on a certain issue to a great extent.

The international mechanism is conducive to creating an environment for promoting cooperation: the norms in the mechanism can change the pay off structure by being “internalized” by the countries concerned.

The information derived from the mechanism can change the views of relevant countries on interests, and the clear provisions of various norms can help to implement the “tit for tat” strategy of making betrayal punishable by clarifying the boundary between cooperation and betrayal.

The existence of verification or supervision means can improve the transparency of the behavior of all parties in the process of cooperation.

In multilateral cooperation, various arrangements can reduce transaction and information costs, while collective implementation mechanisms can reduce the possibility of betrayal and make violators face selective punishment.

It is also pointed out that international mechanisms can not only promote cooperation on issues of the nature of “common interest” typical of the “prisoner’s dilemma”, but also promote cooperation on issues similar to “whether cars drive on the left or right side of the road” “Which language is the working language in international civil aviation” is a relatively simple “common exclusion” issue.

Among the theories related to international mechanisms, Neo liberal institutionalism theory gives the most positive discussion on the role of international mechanisms in promoting international cooperation.

The main premise of international liberalism is that the international political relations between countries have been criticized by the new political paradigm, although it is also in the international realism.

These criticisms show concern for power politics.

Many realists point out that the mechanism theory of neoliberal institutionalism ignores the influence of “power” factor on international cooperation in anarchy.

For example, klesner believes that in many cases, power centered analysis has greater explanatory power than liberal institutionalism.

First of all, there are many international political issues, especially security issues, in the sense of “zero sum”, and the changes on these issues are completely power oriented.

Secondly, in international relations, through the use of power, some participants in the game can be excluded from the game, or a actor can be forced to accept the result that it will not willingly accept at all.

Third, sometimes the focus of the problem is not how to avoid “deception”, but which point on the Pareto boundary should be selected.

In other words, if the choices in front of all parties can increase the benefits of each party than before, but each choice has different degrees of increase in the interests of all parties, which one will become the final choice? In this situation, power will determine the result of choice.

Here, the dispute between “relative benefit” and “absolute benefit” also shows clues.

Joseph.

The criticism of Greco’s new liberalism focuses on this system.

His view is that the fundamental difference between realism and Neo liberal institutionalism lies in the interpretation of the meaning of international anarchy.

In the view of Neo liberal institutionalists, anarchy means that there is no universal government that can urge countries to fulfill their obligations, so they are concerned about how to curb the “deception” in this situation.

According to realism, international anarchy means that countries are in insecurity, and survival has become their core goal.

In this way, countries will pay more attention to relative benefits rather than absolute benefits, and are unwilling to allow other countries to obtain more benefits that may be transformed into the power to suppress and coerce themselves.

Accordingly, the cooperation between countries is more difficult than expected by the Neo liberal institutionalist theory that the country is the pursuit of the maximization of absolute interests.

Around this and other aspects, Greco and kiohan have more responses to each other.

In addition, it is possible that when international cooperation in an issue area is put on the agenda, there is no established mechanism.

Moreover, the establishment of the mechanism itself is a process of cooperation.

Thus, no matter to what extent international mechanisms can facilitate international cooperation, the latter is not always carried out in the environment where the former exists.

However, if the existing mechanisms in one field can provide reference and support for cooperation in another field (including cooperation in the establishment of mechanisms), then the international mechanism will have greater positive significance.